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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-AFfER

United States v. Klubock:

CAN

MASSACHUSETTS' NEW ETHICAL RULE CURB THE PRACTICE OF
SUBPOENAING THE ATTORNEYS OF GRAND JURY TARGETS?

Our system of jurisprudence is underpinned by the very basic sup
position that the critically important frank communication between
attorney and client would not occur if the attorney-client [relation
ship] were readily subjected to outside scrutiny. I
INTRODUCTION

No outside scrutiny of an attorney-client relationship could be
more chilling than the scrutiny of a federal prosecutor intent on prose
cuting the client for a criminal violation. Yet increasingly, federal
prosecutors are subpoenaing attorneys, 2 demanding that they provide
evidence about their clients when those clients are "targets" of grand
jury investigations. As a number of commentators have noted, 3 the
practice of sUbpoenaing defense attorneys to provide documents or tes
timony before the grand jury raises serious concerns. At least, if an
attorney raises a legal challenge to the subpoena, the additionallitiga
tion may disrupt the preparation of the client's defense. 4 If the attor
1. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center), 615 F. Supp. 958, 962 (D.
Mass. 1985).
2. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Genego, Risky Business: The Hazards of Being a Criminal Defense Law
yer, 1 CRIM. JuST. 2 (Spring, 1986); Hoffman, KeIston & Shaughnessy, Attorney Subpoenas
and Massachusetts Rule PF 15, 74 MASS. L. REV. 95 (Summer, 1989); Peirce & Co
lamarino, Defense Counsel as a Witness for the Prosecution: Curbing the Practice of Issuing
Grand Jury Subpoenas to Counsel for Targets of Investigations, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 821
(1985); Rudolf & Maher, The Attorney Subpoena: You are Hereby Commanded to Betray
Your Client, 1 CRIM. JUST. 14 (Spring, 1986); Stem & Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The
Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783 (1988);
Weiner, Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Proposal for Reform, 23 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 95 (1985); Comment, Grand Jury Subpoenas to Defense Attorneys Representing
Targets: An Ethical/Legal Tug of War, 9 CAMPBELL L. REV. 347 (1987) [hereinafter Com
ment, An Ethical/Legal Tug of War]; Comment, Grand Jury Subpoenas ofa Target's Attor
ney: The Need for a Preliminary Showing, 20 GA. L. REV. 747 (1986).
4. "[A]n attorney-client subpoena thoroughly disrupts the representation of the cli
ent. Subpoena litigation is customarily fast-track, intensive litigation which diverts counsel
from the task of representation." Consolidated Memorandum of Defendant-Intervenors,
Massachusetts Bar Association, Boston Bar Association and Massachusetts Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction
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ney complies with the subpoena and appears before the grand jury, the
relationship of trust between attorney and client may be fatally under
mined. 5 At worst, if the subpoena demands the production of infor
mation highly prejudicial to a client, compliance with the subpoena
may terminate the attorney-client relationship, effectively denying the
client representation by his or her counsel of choice. 6
Federal prosecutors employing the subpoenas point to significant
government interests at stake. 7 An attorney may be the only feasible
source for information vital to the successful indictment and prosecu
tion of his or her client. Effective crime control is one of the funda
mental functions of government. An attorney may be participating in
a client's criminal activities. It has long been recognized that the at
torney-client privilege does not shield the parties from disclosure when
attorney and client are both participants in criminal activity.8
Although commentators and the defense bar have expressed con
cern about the practice of sUbpoenaing attorneys during grand jury
investigations, thus far proposals for reform have not been notably
successful. In a series of cases, defense attorneys appealed to the fed
eral courts to quash attorney subpoenas on the basis of the courts'
supervisory power over the grand jury. Although several courts were
initially responsive,9 the tide soon turned the other way.to In 1985,
the Department of Justice responded to concern about the practice of
subpoenaing attorneys by promulgating guidelines regulating the use
at 19, United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 832 F.2d 649 (1st
Cir.), aff'd en bane, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987).
5. "The very presence of the attorney in the grand jury room, even if only to assert
valid privileges, can raise doubts in the client's mind as to his lawyer's unfettered devotion
to the client's interests and thus impair or at least impinge upon the attorney-client rela
tionship." In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
6. "The practice of [calling a lawyer before the grand jury] permits the government
by unilateral action to create the possibility of a conflict of interest between attorney and
client, which may lead to a suspect's being denied his choice of counsel by disqualification."
Id. at 945-46.
7. See infra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
8. See generally D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 213 (1981).
9. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985),
rev'd en bane, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, withdrawn on other grounds, 697 F.2d 112
(4th Cir. 1982).
10. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Hill), 786 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1986); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1108 (1986); Matter of Klein, 776 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(Battle), 748 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 721 F.2d
1221 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir.
1983).
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of attorney subpoenas. I I However, commentators have tended to
agree that the guidelines do not sufficiently protect the attorney-client
relationship. 12
Recently, in Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court (S.J.C.)
addressed the increase in attorney subpoenas by means of an ethical
rule governing prosecutorial conduct. In response to a petition from
the Massachusetts Bar Association (M.B.A.), the court adopted Prose
cution Function 15 (PF 15)13 into its canon of ethics. The rule, which
applies to federal as well as state prosecutors,14 makes it unethical for
a prosecutor to subpoena an attorney whose client is a grand jury "tar
get" to obtain information about that client unless the prosecutor re
ceives prior judicial approval for the SUbpoena.
When PF 15 was promulgated, the United States District Attor
ney for Massachusetts promptly sued in federal court seeking a declar
atory judgment that the rule would not apply to federal prosecutors.
In United States v. Klubock 15 the First Circuit Court of Appeals af
firmed PF 15's validity as a federal court rule. Nevertheless, there
remain a number of unresolved issues with respect to PF 15. In fact,
the Klubock litigation had the ironic effect of narrowing the parame
ters of discussion and deflecting attention from the rule's actual opera
tion. For example, despite a proposal from the M.B.A. that would
have specified standards to aid judges in determining whether an attor
11. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.161 (1985) [hereinafter D.O.J.
GUIDELINES]. See infra notes 172-84 and accompanying text for the partial text of the
guidelines and a discussion of their effect.
12. See Stern & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1819-20; Comment, An Ethical/Legal Tug
of War, supra note 3, at 375-76. But see Weiner, supra note 3, at 125-33.
13. Prosecution Function 15 states: "It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to
subpoena an attorney to a grand jury without prior judicial approval in circumstances
where the prosecutor seeks to compel the attorney/witness to provide evidence concerning
a person who is represented by the attorney/witness." MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:08, PF
15.
14. PF 15 applies to federal prosecutors because the Massachusetts federal district
courts adopt, by local court rule, the S.J.C.'s ethical rules of conduct:
Acts or omissions by an attorney admitted to practice before this court pursuant
to this Rule 5, or appearing and practicing before this court pursuant to Rule 6,
individually or in concert with any other person or persons, that violate the ethi
cal requirements and rules concerning the practice of law of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, shall constitute misconduct and shall be grounds for discipline,
whether or not the act or omission occurred in the course of an attorney-client
relationship. The ethical requirements and rules concerning the practice of law
mean those canons and rules adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa
chusetts, embodied in Rules 3:05, 3:07 and 3:08 of said court.
MASS. CT. R. 5(d)(4)(B).
15. 832 F.2d 649, aff'd en bane, 832 F.2d 664 (1st. Cir. 1987).
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ney subpoena should be served,16 the rule as promulgated is silent in
this respect. Additionally, the rule leaves unspecified the type of
proceeding at which a judge should decide whether a subpoena should
be served. Answers to these and similar questions are crucial to judg
ing PF 15's effectiveness as a solution to the attorney subpoena
controversy.
As background to an examination of PF 15, this comment first
reviews the grand jury's powers and its role in the criminal process. It
then discusses the rationales advanced by prosecutors and defense at
torneys for and against the use of attorney subpoenas, and considers
whether the attorney-client relationship is sufficiently protected by
current federal practice and procedure, including the attorney-client
privilege, motions to quash subpoenas under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17(c), and the Department of Justice's guidelines on attor
ney subpoenas. It examines the impact of PF 15 on existing federal
procedures and considers the effect of including additional substantive
and procedural provisions to strengthen the rule. Finally, it considers
whether the district courts' rulemaking power is sufficient for the task
of resolving the attorney subpoena controversy.
I.

THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY

The federal grand jury in theory functions as both a "sword and a
shield": "Its responsibilities . . . include both the determination
whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed
and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecu
tions."17 In keeping with its charge to help protect society from crimi
nal activity, the grand jury has broad investigatory powers. 18 Grand
jury operations are clothed in secrecy, and free of many of the con
straints that govern trial juries. 19
16. See infra note 249 for the text of the M.B.A. proposal.
17. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
Although the courts continue to ascribe a protective function to the grand jury, several
procedural rules call into question its ability to perform that function. For example, the
prosecution has no obligation to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, nor is the
prosecutor required to present evidence bearing on the credibility of a witness. 1
ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 6: 102 (M. Rhodes 2d
ed. 1985). The target of a grand jury investigation has no right to appear and testify before
a grand jury to present his or her side of the story. Id. at § 6:77.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) ("A grand jury has
broad investigative powers to determine whether a crime has been committed and who has
committed it. ").
19. Several recent Supreme Court decisions have detailed the operations of the grand
jury and reaffirmed the scope of its powers. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
342-46 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-88 (1972). As the Court noted in
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The grand jury's existence is guaranteed by the fifth amend
ment,20 testimony to the protective function it performed during the
American Revolution. 21 The federal courts call the grand jury into
existence and have the responsibility for issuing and enforcing grand
jury subpoenas. 22 Federal prosecutors, representatives of the execu
tive branch, serve as the grand jury's guide in the legal intricacies
which jurors must understand to assess whether there is probable
cause to indict. In theory, control and oversight of the federal grand
jury are shared by the judicial and the executive branches. Its sup
posed independence has provided a guarantee that its extensive powers
would not be abused. Yet the nature of the grand jury's investigative
powers is problematic. In a democratic society, the secrecy of grand
Calandra, the grand jury deliberates in secret. The federal grand jury is unconstrained by
the rules of evidence, including rules on hearsay and relevance, that govern the petit jury.
On the basis of evidence presented by the prosecutor, grand jury members decide whether
probable cause exists to indict a particular person for a serious crime. However, the grand
jury also performs a more active investigatory function, aiding in the investigation to deter
mine whether a crime has been committed. Historically, the grand jury has begun investi
gations based on its own knowledge, on tips or rumors, or on evidence proffered by a
prosecutor. Id.
The reasons for grand jury secrecy are:
'(I) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent
persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to
encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information
with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused [sic]
who is exonerated from disclosure by the fact that he has been under investiga
tion, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of
guilt.'
United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958) (quoting United States v.
Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (1954».
20. The fifth amendment reads in part: "No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See, e.g., Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 16: "[t]he Fifth Amendment guarantees that no civilian
may be brought to trial for an infamous crime 'unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury.' " Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
21. As tensions between colonists and Great Britain rose, colonial grand juries often
refused to indict people charged with offences committed in protest against continuing Brit
ish rule. The most celebrated case is that of John Peter Zenger, a New York newspaper
publisher whom the British authorities sought to prosecute for criminal libel. M. FRANKEL
& G. NAFfALlS, THE GRAND JURY AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 10-12 (1977).
22. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 (describing procedures for summoning and discharging
grand juries, procedures governing juror selection, rules for recording proceedings and re
quiring secrecy, and the procedure for returning an indictment). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17
(governing procedure for the issuance of federal subpoenas, including grand jury
subpoenas).
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jury proceedings and their compulsory nature are at odds with ideals
of openness and fairness. 23 The grand jury has commanded continu
ing allegiance because it contributes substantially to effective law en
forcement and because it retains, whether or not deserved, "the image
[ot] an independent protector of individual liberties. "24
A.

Charges of Grand Jury Abuse and Proposals for Reform

In recent years, discussion of grand jury reform has been based
largely on a perception that the grand jury is no longer an independent
institution in any significant sense. 25 There is wide agreement that the
grand jury has become a working tool of the prosecutor. 26 Jurors no
longer act on their own knowledge of criminal activity in the commu
23. Supreme Court Justice Black noted the danger to democracy in secret proceed
ings: "[slecret inquisitions are dangerous things justly feared by free men everywhere.
They are the breeding place for arbitrary misuse of official power." In re Groban, 352 U.S.
330, 352 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting).
24. Zwerling, Federal Grand Juries v. Attorney Independence and the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1263, 1267 (1976).
25. Emerson, author of a National Institute of Justice monograph on the grand jury,
explains that the perception of grand jury abuse arose during the 1960's and 1970's as a
result of the Department of Justices's Internal Security Division's investigations of political
dissidents. She states that criticism has come, however, not only from the targets of such
investigations, but also from organized labor, the news media, the business community, and
other groups. D. EMERSON, GRAND JURY REFORM: A REVIEW OF KEY ISSUES 12, 14
(1983).
26. See, e.g., Zwerling, supra note 24. Professor Zwerling notes that during the 1974
hearings on the grand jury by the House Judiciary Committee, Assistant Attorney General
W. Vincent Rakestraw wrote to Congressman Peter Rodino that, " 'in our judgement the
grand jury does not operate to protect the individual to any substantial degree.''' Id. at
1268 (quoting 120 CONGo REC. 11,355 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1974)).
Frankel and Naftalis, both experienced in the operation of grand juries, noted that
"[dlay in and day out, the grand jury affirms what the prosecutor calls upon it to affirm
investigating as it is led, ignoring what it is never advised to notice, failing to indict or
indicting as the prosecutor 'submits' that it should." M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra
note 21, at 22.
In 1972, Judge William Campbell, a district court judge for 32 years and the head of a
committee charged with discovering the causes of delay in the administration of criminal
justice, suggested abolishing the grand jury as quickly as possible: "This great institution of
the past has long ceased to be the guardian of the people .... Today it is but a convenient
tool for the prosecutor . . . . Any experienced prosecutor will admit that he can indict
anybody at any time for almost anything before any grand jury." Delays in Criminal Cases,
55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (undated).
Frequently cited in this context is a statement by Supreme Court Justice William
Douglas:
It is, indeed, common knowledge that the grand jury, having been conceived as a
bulwark between the citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the Execu
tive.... It is not uncommon for witnesses summoned to appear before the grand
jury at a designated room to discover that the room is the room of the prosecutor.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 23-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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nity. They assess probable cause based on evidence presented to them
by a prosecutor. Inevitably they rely on prosecutors for assistance in
comprehending the complexities of federal criminal statutes.
In The Grand Jury An Institution on Trial,27 Marvin Frankel,
former District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York,
and Gary Naftalis, a former United States attorney, argue convinc
ingly that "it is not profitable to mourn the grand jury's 'loss' of inde
pendence."28 They point out that in a modern society, law
enforcement is inescapably an activity for professionals. 29 The danger,
of course, is that those professionals will misuse what Frankel and
Naftalis refer to as the grand jury's "awesome range of powers."30
If it is true that the grand jury now functions primarily as an arm
to -law enforcement authorities, the case can be made that certain due
process protections and other individual rights not currently recog
nized in the grand jury context should be extended to individuals sub
poenaed to appear before the grand jury.31 In fact, there have been
some changes in this area during the last decade. The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure have been amended to require that all grand
jury proceedings be recorded. 32 A number of states have implemented
additional major reforms proposed by the American Bar Association,
including the right to counsel in the jury room and use of the trial
rules of evidence before the grand jury.33 However, in the federal sys
tem in particular, substantive movement toward grand jury reform has
27.
(1977).
28.

M. FRANKEL & G. NAFfALIS, THE GRAND JURY AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL

Id. at 23.
Id. at 22-23.
30. Id. at 5.
3!. In 1982, the American Bar Association (A.B.A.) published a Model Grand Jury
Act proposing a number of reforms, including among others the right to counsel in the
grand jury room, transactional immunity, the right of a "target" to testify if he or she signs
a waiver of immunity, a requirement that all grand jury proceedings be recorded, and a
prohibition against calling lawyers to testify to matters learned during the legitimate prepa
ration of a case or being subpoenaed to produce work product material concerning the
client's case. A.B.A. SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, A.B.A. GRAND JURY POLICY AND
MODEL ACT 2 (1977-82) [hereinafter A.B.A. GRAND JURY POLICY AND MODEL ACT].
As Emerson notes, the major reason for these proposed reforms is to extend to grand
jury witnesses (particularly those whose activities are the subject of grand jury investiga
tion) at least some of the due process rights the criminal justice system grants after indict
ment. D. EMERSON, supra note 25, at 14.
32. "Recording of Proceedings: All proceedings, except when the grand jury is delib
erating or voting, shall be recorded." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(I).
33. D. EMERSON, supra note 25. Emerson selected California, Colorado, Massachu
setts, New Mexico, New York and South Dakota as study sites because these states had
implemented major grand jury reforms. However, they are by no means the only states to
have done so. Id. at 16.
29.

290

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11 :283

been slow. 34 In the absence of legislative reform, federal grand jury
witnesses have invoked constitutional rights pr the courts' supervisory
power and have asked federal judges to curb perceived abuses of grand
jury procedures.35 In general, these appeals have sought protection
from the grand jury's substantial power to compel testimony and the
production of documents.

B.

The Grand Jury's Subpoena Power

A corollary of the broad investigative powers traditionally
ascribed to the grand jury is its far reaching subpoena power. 36 In this
context the "longstanding principle" that "the public ... has a right to
every man's evidence"37 is regularly cited. The only exceptions recog
nized to this principle are those in which the person called to testify or
to produce documents is protected by a "constitutional, common-law,
34. A.B.A. GRAND JURY POLICY AND MODEL ACT, supra note 31, at 1.
35. For example, in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), newsmen claiming
that the first amendment protected their right not to reveal to the grand jury the identity of
news sources, asked the courts to create a qualified privilege for newsmen. They sought the
protection of the judiciary, which would have determined whether the state had made a
sufficient showing of need and relevance when a reporter was called on to testify before a
grand jury and reveal information about the identity of a confidential source. The Supreme
Court declined "to embark the judiciary on ... [the] long and difficult journey ....[t]he
administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege would [re]present." Id. at 703-04.
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973), eert. denied,
421 U.S. 1015 (1975), the court accepted plaintiff's invitation to exercise a supervisory role
over grand jury subpoenas. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that before an indi
vidual resisting a grand jury subpoena was found in contempt of court, the government was
required to make a preliminary showing that the evidence sought was "relevant to an inves
tigation being .conducted by the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and [was]
not sought primarily for another purpose." Id. at 93.
In several cases in which attorneys were subpoenaed to provide information about
clients who were targets of grand jury investigations, the attorneys argued that if they were
forced to comply, their clients' sixth amendment right to effective counsel and/or fifth
amendment right to due process would be violated. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served
Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985) and the en bane opinion reversing that decision, In
re Grand Jury Subpeona Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), eert. denied 475 U.S.
1108 (1986).
36. The basic investigative advantage of the grand jury stems from its ability to
use the subpoena authority of the court that impanelled it. The grand jury may
use the subpoena duces tecum to obtain tangible evidence and the subpoena ad
testificandum to obtain testimony. Both subpoenas are supported by the court's
authority to hold in contempt any person who willfully refuses, without legal
justification, to comply with a subpoena's directive.
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 353 (1985).
37. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950»; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2191 (P. Tillers rev. ed. 1983».
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or statutory privilege. "38 Courts have generally interpreted these testi
monial shields narrowly to allow the grand jury to pursue all possible
leads in its investigatory capacity.39 While the United States Supreme
Court has consistently affirmed the judiciary's power to supervise the
issuance of grand jury subpoenas,40 the Court's recent cases suggest
that the lower courts' power must be used sparingly.41 Nonetheless, a
judicial supervisory power exists if grand jury investigations are "insti
tuted or conducted other than in good faith."42 To date, the Court has
not defined with any precision the extent of the federal courts' power
to quash grand jury subpoenas, except to suggest caution in its
exercise.
II.

A GROWING CONTROVERSY: SUBPOENAS TO ATTORNEYS
WHOSE CLIENTS ARE SUBJECTS OF GRAND JURY
INVESTIGATIONS

The 1980's have seen significant growth in the use of federal
grand jury subpoenas issued to attorneys whose clients are grand jury
"targets."43 These subpoenas are aimed at obtaining information
about the attorneys' clients. While precise documentation of secret
grand jury proceedings is impossible, no one denies that there has been
38. Id. The testimonial shields most pertinent in the grand jury context are the fol
lowing: (I) the privilege against self-incrimination based on the fifth amendment of the U.S.
Constitution (confirmed as existing in the grand jury context in Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892», 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (P. Tillers rev. ed. 1983) at
§ 2252; and (2) the common law attomey-client privilege, operative "[w]here legal advice
of any kind is sought [] from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, [] the
communications relating to that purpose, [] made in confidence [] by the client [] are at his
instance permanently protected [] from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, []
except the protection be waived." Id. at § 2292.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (fourth amendment
protection against unlawful search and seizure does not protect against use of illegally
seized evidence by grand jury); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (no first amend
ment protection for journalists seeking to claim confidentiality of sources).
40. "Grand juries are subject to judicial control and subpoenas to motions to quash."
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708. Similarly, in Calandra, the Court reviewed restrictions on the
grand jury's subpoena power and noted that "[j]udicial supervision is properly exercised in
such cases to prevent the wrong before it occurs." Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Dion
isio, 410 U.S. I (1972); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
42. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
43. The process has been viewed with concern because of its potentially deleterious
effects on attorney-client relationships and because of its possible impact on the adversary
system as a whole. See infra notes 61-87 and accompanying text.
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a significant increase in attorney subpoenas during this decade. 44 In
response to concern expressed about these ':attorney subpoenas," the
government urges that a new focus on whit'e collar crime, organized
crime, and well financed drug dealing operations requires aggressive
tactics, and that these tactics are sanctioned by law. On its side, the
defense bar expresses concern for defendants' right to effective counsel
and even for the continued viability of the adversary system of crimi
nal justice.
A.

The Government's Need for Information

The government has important interests at stake in maintaining
unimpeded the grand jury's subpoena power. That power has been
seen as crucial to the effective functioning of the grand jury as an in-"
vestigatory body. As the Supreme Court noted in Branzburg v.
44. See Weiner, supra note 3, at 95 n.l (collecting reported cases that illustrate the
trend).
The Kluboek litigation provided unusual statistical evidence of the practice in Massa
chusetts: in Kluboek, United States District Attorney Weld indicated that within the last
four years, federal prosecutors had issued from fifty to one hundred subpoenas annually to
attorneys whose clients were targets in grand jury investigations. Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 21, United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D.
Mass. 1986), aff'd, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir.), aff'd en bane, 832 F.2d 664 (Ist Cir. 1987).
The First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that meant that from 10.7% to 32.6% of the
federal criminal cases in Massachusetts resulted in subpoenas issued to attorneys whose
clients were targets of grand jury investigations. United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649,
658 (1 st Cir. 1987).
In 1985, Professor William Genego surveyed members of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, inquiring whether they had received grand jury subpoenas or
I.R.S. summonses, or had been the targets of disqualification motions, actions seeking for
feiture of legal fees, or undercover "sting" operations. Genego, supra note 3, at 2. Genego
reported that of those who responded, 18% reported having received grand jury subpoenas
to testify concerning a client. Id. at 4. Those reporting receipt of grand jury subpoenas
indicated that 68% were received between 1983-85; 18% between 1980-82; 11 % between
1975-79 and 4% before 1974. (Genego indicated there exists some bias in reporting events
that occur over time.) !d. at 4, Table 2.
Among the group whose practice consisted of 50% or more white collar crime cases,
32% reported receiving grand jury sUbpoenas. Id. at 4. Similarly, a higher rate of 26% of
those defense attorneys who had been in practice for 10 years or more reported receiving
grand jury subpoenas. Id. at 6, Table 4.
Genego reported that 80% of his respondents indicated that they believed "the De
partment of Justice has intentionally adopted a practice of investigating and prosecuting
attorneys who represent defendants in a criminal case as a means of inhibiting and discour
aging zealous representation of criminal defendants." Id. at 7.
Hoffman, Kelston & Shaughnessy indicate that the increase in subpoenas to attorneys
represents a conscious choice by the Department of Justice to employ an effective "new
investigative tool." Hoffman, Kelston & Shaughnessy, supra note 3, at 96, (citing W. Land
ers, Remarks at the Conference on Defending the Right to Counsel, held at New York
University Law School (Nov. 15, \986) (tape recording on file with the University of Penn
sylvania Law Review».
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Hayes,45 the grand jury's investigatory role contributes to effective law
enforcement, one of the fundamental functions of government. 46
Commentators have generally agreed that testimonial privileges,
which interfere with the search for truth,47 should be recognized only
when they further a policy that society values. 48 Although the attor
ney subpoena controversy has roots in the attorney-client privilege,
one that has long been recognized at common law,49 the arguments
counselling against establishing new privileges also counsel that ex
isting privileges be maintained within a relatively narrow scope. 50 Ad
ditional due process protections at the grand jury stage also imply new
procedural steps that would probably cause further delays in the crim
inal justice system and further strains on judicial resources, an unde
sirable result. 51
Changes in substantive law, including the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Statute 52 and the Continuing Criminal En
terprise Statute, 53 may account in part for the recent increase in sub
poenas to attorneys.54 For example, In re Grand Jury Subpoena
45. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
46. "Fair and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person
and property of the individual is a fundamental function of government, and the grand jury
plays an important, constitutionally mandated role in this process." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at
690.
47. See, e.g., Branzburg noting that "[t]he creation of new testimonial privileges has
been met with disfavor by commentators since such privileges obstruct the search for
truth." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690 n.29. See generally J. WIGMORE, supra note 38, at
§ 2291; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 205-06 (3d ed. 1984); E. MORGAN, Foreward to
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942).
48. J. WIGMORE, supra note 38, at § 2192(3).
49. "The history of this privilege goes back to the reign of Elizabeth I, where the
privilege already appears as unquestioned." Id. at § 2290 (footnote omitted).
50. "[Privileges] should be recognized only within the narrowest limits required by
principle." Id. at § 2192(3). But see D. LOUISELL & c. MUELLER, supra note 8, at 730-34
(arguing for a more expansive approach to the attorney-client privilege).
51. In Dionisio, the Supreme Court cautioned against impeding grand jury investiga
tions with "mini trials and preliminary showings" on the reasonableness of particular grand
jury subpoenas. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 17.
52. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
53. Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute (CCE) 21 U.S.c. § 848 (\98\ & Supp.
\985).
54. Professor Genego indicated this might be a partial explanation of the rise in sub
poenas to attorneys:
The recent use of certain practices might be seen as a consequence of the govern
ment's decision to concentrate its prosecutorial resources on certain kinds of of
fenses. The complex nature of many white collar and drug offenses, which
commonly involve the control and transfer of assets and other recorded events
in particular offenses charged under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or
ganization statute (18 U.S.c. § 1962) and Continuing Criminal Enterprise of
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Served Upon Doe 55 involved a subpoena served on the attorney of an
alleged head of an organized crime family. The government's position
was that if the attorney testified that his client had paid the legal fees
of other individuals charged as members of the crime family, that
would establish existence of "an enterprise" as defined by the RICO
statute. 56
In other cases, attorneys may be a convenient source, or even the
only source, for information prosecutors need as evidence that a crime
has been committed. 57 Attorney fee information, unprotected by the
attorney-client privilege,58 may be necessary to trace certain transfers
of funds in alleged illegal money laundering schemes. Fee information
may help establish the extent of a client's wealth, providing evidence
of a Tax Code violation. 59 An attorney may be directly implicated in
the client's criminal activities. 60 If the government is denied access to
fenses (21 U.s.c. § 848)-make it more likely that relevant evidence will be in the
hands of attorneys.
Genego, supra note 3, at 40.
See A.B.A. GRAND JURY POLICY AND MODEL ACT, supra note 31, at I for the view
that grand juries and their subpoena power are particularly effective in investigations of
complex white collar crime.
55. 759 F.2d 968 (2d. Cir. 1985), rev'd en bane, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
56. Id. at 242.
57. United States District Attorney for Massachusetts William Weld explained why
his office had issued subpoenas to attorneys:
Such subpoenas have, on many occasions, been essential to obtaining documen
tary evidence and testimony relating to serious crimes, including violations of the
narcotics laws, tax laws, white collar crime and corruption offenses. In many if
not most cases, such subpoenas seek routine and uncontroversial information
from lawyers who hold financial and legal documents often available from no
other source.
Affidavit of William F. Weld at 4, United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass.
1986), aff'd, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir.), aff'd en bane, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987).
58. "Fee arrangements usually fall outside the scope of the [attorney-client] privilege
simply because such information ordinarily reveals no confidential professional communi
cation between attorney and client." In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1983).
59. See e.g.. Matter of Klein, 776 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985) (grand jury investigating,
inter alia, possible income tax evasion, subpoenaed records of attorney fees).
60. The President's Commission on Organized Crime indicated it found substantial
evidence of lawyers using their skills to further the criminal activities of their clients.
(Members of the defense bar questioned the Commission's credibility, on the basis that
most of the information came from anonymous, and therefore untrustworthy, sources.) 72
A.B.A. J. 32 (March 1, 1986).
United States District Attorney William Weld indicated that his office "ha[d] prose
cuted a number of lawyers for insurance fraud, narcotics offences, public corruption, tax
offenses and other violations of federal law ... [and that it had been necessary in these
cases] to obtain documents from the lawyer or associates of the lawyer relating to persons
represented by the lawyer." Affidavit of William F. Weld at 7, United States v. Klubock,
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information held by attorneys, there is a risk that certain criminal vio
lations will not be prosecuted. Nonetheless, the government's need
must be balanced against the disturbing implications the practice of
sUbpoenaing attorneys has for attorney-client relationships and the ad
versary system.
B.

The Otherlnterest at Stake: Imperiling the Attorney-Client
Relationship

A subpoena to the attorney of a grand jury target may pose one of
several distinct threats to the attorney-client relationship. For pur
poses of this discussion, suppose that A, attorney to B, has been repre
senting her client for two years. B is now the target of a grand jury
investigation, and A has been subpoenaed to produce documents and
to testify about the fees B has paid her.61 Imagine further that B's
legitimate sources of income are modest, and the fees he has paid to A
appear disproportionately high, so that A's evidence has a strong ten
dency to prove that B has an illicit source of income. A's subpoena
poses an immediate threat to the trust between A and B. Because the
hearings before a grand jury are secret, if A does testify, B cannot be
sure of the nature of his attorney's testimony before that body. 62 If A
arranges with a prosecutor not to appear, B may distrust the nature of
that arrangement. The secrecy of grand jury proceedings is not the
sole reason the subpoena to A may undermine her relationship with B.
It is most likely that B consulted A anticipating that A would keep all
aspects of their relationship confidential. 63 A probably encouraged B
639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir.), aff'd en bane, 832 F.2d
664 (1st Cir. 1987).
61. Information about fees paid to an attorney is generally not protected by the attor
ney-client privilege. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
62. "The duty of undivided loyalty of counsel to his client, traditionally considered
an essential element in according a client his due process rights, is questioned by the client
whenever his attorney is summoned before the grand jury--even if only to assert valid
privileges--during the course of that representation." In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served
Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986) (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting).
63. Professor David Fried has written of his personal experience with the attorneyclient relationship:
The author's experience as a litigator, together with the anecdotal evidence of
other attorneys, suggests ... that clients confide freely in their attorneys because
they are well aware of the [attorney-client] privilege and entirely unaware of any
exceptions to it. When they learn exceptions exist and may be applicable to their
cases, they typically are shocked.
Fried, Too High a Price/or Truth: the Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege/or Contem
plated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C.L. REV. 443, 491 n.270 (1985-86).
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to speak freely, so she could give fully informed advice.64 The practi
cal effect of a loss of trust is that B may no longer feel free to confide to
A facts that A should know but which B fears may appear damaging
to his interests. As one court noted, absent protection for the attor
ney-client relationship, "[l]awyers would ... have to choose between
foregoing information indispensable to the provision of ... competent
lega:l representation or hearing the information and exposing the client
to risk of subsequent disclosure to an adversary."65
Second, a subpoena in these circumstances may create an ethical
dilemma for A whose own best interests may now be in conflict with
those of her client. 66 B's interests might be best served if A resists the
subpoena and risks contempt charges. A will probably be unwilling to
risk the sanctions associated with civil contempt; she will probably
comply with the subpoena. In fact, she has a professional responsibil
ity to do SO.67 Even if there exists a legal basis for challenging the
subpoena through a Rule 17(c) motion to quash,68 the attorney's ener
gies may be diverted from the client's case to fighting the subpoena in
court. This may impair A's ability to represent B adequately in other
64. Again, Professor Fried: "It is usual for attorneys, when first interviewing a client,
to emphasize that everything the latter says will be kept in confidence." Id.
65. In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984).
66. Criminal defense attorney Nancy Gertner was one of five attorneys subpoenaed
to appear before a federal grand jury in a drug case in which the attorneys were preparing
to defend the same clients in pending state proceedings. (The subpoenas were quashed; the
case is reported as In re Grand Jury Matters, 593 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.H.), ajJ'd In re Grand
Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984». She later wrote:
[T]he subpoenas necessarily created a conflict of interest .betwe~n eacJ:1. lawyer an~
his or her client. Compliance with the subpoena is in the lawyer's best interest.
However, it is in the client's interest for his or her attorney to resist any compli
ance that would increase the likelihood of conviction in the pending prosecution
or of the indictment on additional charges.
Appendices to Memorandum of Defendant-Intervenors in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for Preliminary Injunction No.7 at 3-4, United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D.
Mass. 1986), aff'd, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir.), aff'd en bane, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987).
67. Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that "[a] lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to representation of a client ... except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1987).
The commentary to the rule indicates that "[t]he lawyer must comply with the final
. orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give
information about the client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6,
Comment 19. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2)
(1980), permitting the attorney to reveal a client's confidences when required to do so by
law or court order. A grand jury subpoena is a court order to appear and testify, which can
only be challenged on the basis of a constitutional, common law, or statutory privilege.
68. See infra notes 144-70 and accompanying text.
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matters. 69
Third, there is the problem of increased cost facing B if he decides
to request that A litigate to avoid compliance with the subpoena. 7o In
several cases, attorneys moving to quash subpoenas requiring the pro
duction of information adverse to the interests, of their clients hired
additional counsel for consultation and to argue the motions to
quash. 7 !
Of most concern is the potential disqualification from the client's
case of the attorney subpoenaed to testify 'before the grand jury in a
capacity adverse to his client's interests. There are, of course, several
obvious reasons why B might have a strong interest in retaining A
rather than another attorney. B already has a longstanding relation
ship with A and has probably relied on A's advice in making decisions
that are now the basis of a criminal investigfltion.72 Their lengthy as
sociation implies a relationship of trust betw"een them and B's belief in
A's competence. Nevertheless, in spite of B's strong desire to maintain
an attorney-client relationship with his attorney, A might have to dis
qualify herself from representing B in the; criminal prosecution that
may result from the grand jury investigation.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits A from
representing B if A may be called as a witness against B.73 The attor
69, See e,g., United States v, Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1987) indicating the
court's belief that the attorney may not be as effective ~ when he or she has a "difficult
'second front' to deal with." Id, at 653.
70. As the client, B largely controls the decision 'whether A should engage in litiga
tion to quash the subpoena.
71. When defense attorney Nancy Gertner and four colleagues received subpoenas to
testify before the grand jury about clients facing state and federal drug charges, they hired
counsel to litigate the motions to quash those subpoenas: "I, along with Mr. Cullen and
Mr. Wall had to retain counsel and carve time out of the preparation of our clients' cases to
defend ourselves. We retained Professor Charles NessQn of the Harvard Law School to
seek to quash the subpoenas." Appendices to Memorandum of Defendant-Intervenors in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction No.7 at 3, United States v.
Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1986), afJ'd, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir.), afJ'd en bane,
832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir, 1987).
In tum, Attorney Gertner performed the same service for a colleague. See In re
Grand Jury Subpoena (John Doe, Attorney), No. 86-665., slip op. (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 1986)
(available on Lexis, Genfed Library). Attorney Doe, in-house counsel to a corporation,
hired Attorney Gertner to litigate the motion to quash ,the subpoena he had received re
questing information about his employer. Gertner, On Trial! A Disciplinary Rule that
Limits Attorney Subpoenas, I CRIM. JUST. 2 (Fall, 1986) at 43.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1986) (defendants
under investigation for income tax evasion desired to be represented at trial by counsel who
had represented them before the Internal Revenue Service when the I.R.S. first began its
investigation).
73. The A.B.A. Model Code of Professional Responsibility states:
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ney who provides evidence prejudicial to a client before a grand jury
cannot be sure whether she will be called as a trial witness. However,
an attorney should withdraw at the mere possibility of such an out
come. 74 Furthermore, an attorney should withdraw as soon as a possi
ble conflict of interest is apparent, so that his or her successor has as
much time as possible to prepare an effective defense.1 5 Finally, even
if an attorney does not withdraw voluntarily, the government may
move to have the attorney disqualified. 76
The possibility of disqualification raises very serious concerns;
First, potential criminal defendants may be routinely disadvantaged if
grand jury subpoenas result in the disqualification of effective criminal
defense attorneys.77 A New Hampshire district court has even noted
that the prospect of confrontations with prosecutors might discourage
attorneys from the choice ·of a career in criminal defense. 78 Most imIf, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer
learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be called as a witness
other than on behalf of his client, he may continue the representation until it is
apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102 (1981) (emphasis added).
74. "In a close case, an attorney must respect his client's interests and resolve his
doubts in favor of withdrawing as an advocate." In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon
Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 261 (2d Cir.), cm. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986) (Cardamone, J., dis
senting) (citation omitted).
75. "[E]arly withdrawal affords defendant an opportunity to secure new counsel
early enough to be meaningful." [d. at 262.
76. See generally, United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1986) (tria] court
granted government's pretrial motion to disqualify defendants' counsel on basis that coun
sel would be providing evidence against clients; reversed on appeal).
Professor John F. Sutton has criticized the courts' practice of permitting advocates to
use provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility to disqualify opposing counsel:
[M]any courts have used disciplinary rules as though they were procedural rules.
This misuse, or unintended use, has occurred in situations in which the discipli
nary rules are ill-suited for use as procedural rules. Thus, the courts have permit
ted advocates to use DR 5-101(B) and DR 5-102 to disqualify the opposing
party's counsel. That result was never intended; on the contrary, those discipli
nary rules were intended to protect a client from overreaching by his own lawyer
who might be willing to lessen his value to his client in order to obtain or continue
employment in litigation.
Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C.L. REV. 497,
515 (1979).
77. Professor Genego's survey of criminal defense attorneys also requested informa
tion on motions by prosecutors to disqualify defense attorneys. Of those defense attorneys
returning the surveys, 26% reported they had beeri targets of motions to disqualify them
from representing a client. Genego, supra note 3, at 4. The more experienced attorneys
and those whose practice consisted predominantly of white collar criminal defense or de
fense related to drug charges had most frequently been the targets of motions by the gov
ernment to disqualify them. Id. at 6, Tables 3 and 4.
78. "Also to be considered [as factors in the court's decision to quash grand jury
subpoenas directed to attorneys] is ... the reluctance of capable attorneys to continue or to
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portant, the adversary system may be undermined if the prosecutor,
rather than a neutral umpire, has veto power over a potential defend
ant's choice of counsel. 79
In addition, although no court has gone so far as to hold that the
United States Constitution forbids the use of attorney subpoenas ab
sent compelling need, several courts have noted that the deprivation of
counsel of choice might implicate fifth amendment due process con
cerns and sixth amendment counsel of choice concerns. For example,
three members of the First Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that
"due process is ... implicated [when attorneys are subpoenaed to ap
pear before the grand jury] because the attorney/prosecutor is poten
tially given control over who shall be his attorney/adversary."8o
Judge Cardamone, in dissent in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served
Upon Doe,81 argued that freely permitting prosecutors to subpoena at
torneys infringed upon the guarantee of due process. It is, he stated,
unfair to make a defendant pick between "the Scylla of relying on
present counsel who has gone before the grand jury and the Chrybdis
of finding new, untested counsel."82 Fairness and impartiality in the
legal system are the essence of the fifth amendment guarantee of due
process. 83
With respect to the sixth amendment right to counsel, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals initially held in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Served Upon Doe 84 that, although the sixth amendment right to coun
sel did not attach at the grand jury stage,85 the target of a grand jury
consider a full or partial career in the practice of criminal law and the further depletion in
the paucity of capable trial lawyers ...." In re Grand Jury Matters, 593 F. Supp. 103, 107
(D.N.H.), aff'd, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984).
79. Professor William Genego, discussing the problem of fair tactics in an adversary
system, concluded that any practice which gives the prosecutor (rather than a neutral
member of the judiciary) unilateral control over the "allocation of power" was not a legiti
mate adversarial tactic. Genego, Proseeutorial Control Over a Defendant's Choice of Coun
sel, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 17,29-30 (1987).
80. United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 654 (1st Cir.), aff'd en bane, 832 F.2d
664 (1st Cir. 1987).
81. 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), eert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
82. Id. at 261.
83. Id.
84. 759 F.2d 968 (2d. Cir. 1985), rev'd en bane, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), eert. denied,
475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
85. The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether a grand
jury "target" is entitled to counsel at the grand jury stage of criminal proceedings. How
ever, the Court has said that the constitutional right to counsel, embodied in the sixth
amendment, only attaches "at .or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have
been initiated against [someone] ... whether by way offormal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972).
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investigation had a right of "constitutional dimensions"86 to preserve
the possibility of hiring the lawyer of his <?r her choice,87 in a case in
which indictment later occurred. 88
In response to these defense concerns, prosecutors claim that the
features of the present federal system-specifically the attorney-client
privilege, the availability of motions to quash subpoenas under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c), and the Department of Justice's
internal guidelines governing attorney subpoenas-adequately protect
the attorney-client relationship. To evaluate whether these protections
are sufficient, this comment next examines each of them in the context
of grand jury practice.

III.

CURRENT FEDERAL PRACTICES PROTECTING THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

The attorney-client privilege both permits and requires the attor
ney to protect the confidentiality of information exchanged between
attorney and client. The privilege recognizes the attorney's role as
confidential advisor and champion in an adversarial system of justice.
In the grand jury context, the attorney-client privilege is among those
"common law privileges" referred to in Branzburg v. Hayes 89 which
shield information from the subpoena power of the grand jury. Fed
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c)90 has both procedural and sub
stantive components. Procedurally, the rule provides the only means
other than simple defiance of evading the obligation to testify created
by a grand jury subpoena. Substantively, the rule authorizes the court
to quash grand jury subpoenas that are "unreasonable or oppressive."
The Department of Justice, source of the attorney subpoenas issued in
the course of grand jury investigations, has implemented internal
guidelines limiting the use of this "investigative tool." The extent of
protection the attorney-client relationship derives from these sources
is examined below.
86. In In re Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, withdrawn on other
grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals used similarly
equivocal language, holding that "this subpoena [to Harvey's attorney] implicates Harvey's
constitutional right to counsel of his choice." Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
87. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Supreme Court. held that the sixth
amendment right to counsel meant counsel of defendant's own choice. The right is not
absolute: "th[e] protection goes no further than preventing arbitrary dismissal of the chosen
attorney." United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
88. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d at 975.
89. 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
90. See infra note 144 for the text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c).
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The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine

United States District Court Judge Charles Wyzanski's often
cited definition of the attorney-client privilege,91 articulated in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,92 sets out these elements:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a

client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is
[the] member of a bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in con
nection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the com
munication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a)
by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the pur
pose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding ... and not (d)
for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege
has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client. 93

The privilege belongs to the client in the case, not to the attorney;94
however, the attorney has an obligation to assert the privilege on be
half of his or her client. 95 The privilege protects against the disclosure
of confidential communications96 made by the client to the attorney.
Communications from the attorney to the client are considered privi
leged if their disclosure would reveal the nature of a confidential com
91. The other similar and frequently cited definition of the attorney-client privilege
was enunciated by Professor Wigmore:
[The party may assert the privilege] (I) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communica
tions relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at
his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
J. WIGMORE, supra note 38, at § 2292.
92. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
93. [d. at 358-59.
94. "The privilege thus is one that exists for the benefit of the client and not the
attorney." Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 1956) (citing Chirac v.
Reinicker, 11 Wheat. 280, 294 (1826».
95. "[T]he attorney has the duty, upon any attempt to require him to testify or pro
duce documents within the confidence, to make assertion of the privilege ... as a matter of
professional responsibility in preventing the policy of the law from being violated." [d.
96. The United States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between a confidential
communication and the actual information communicated:
The protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to facts.
A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely differ
ent thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, 'What did you
say or write to the attorney?' but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact ...
merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication
to his attorney.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981) (citing Philadelphia v. Westing
house Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962».
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munication from the client to the attorney.97 The privilege attaches
only when an attorney is consulted in his or her capacity as an attor
ney, and not when an attorney provides non-legal services such as
business advice. 98
In Fisher v. United States,99 the Supreme Court explained that the
privilege exists to encourage clients to disclose completely their cir
cumstances to counsel so they will obtain "fully informed legal ad
vice." 100 The Court went on to note the tension between the privilege
and the ideal of providing the factfinder with all relevant evidence, and
to state that the privilege applies only "where necessary to achieve its
purpose." 101 Accordingly, "[t]he relationship itself does not create '[a]
cloak of protection [which is] draped around all occurrences and con
versations which have any bearing, direct or indirect, upon the rela
tionship of the attorney with his client.' "102 The justification for the
attorney-client privilege advanced in Fisher has been called the "in
strumental justification,"103 meaning that no more protection should
be provided to the attorney-client relationship than is absolutely neces
sary to encourage individuals to confide in counsel.
The privilege operates to protect an attorney from testifying
against a client at trial. It also operates in the grand jury context,
excusing an attorney from giving a grand jury information concerning
confidential communications-spoken or written-between client and
attorney. However, the party asserting the privilege has the burden of
proving that the privilege applies,I04 and most federal courts require
the party claiming the privilege to appear before the grand jury 105 and
assert the privilege with respect to each item of evidence in conten
tion. 106 Thus, even with respect to protected information, the privi
97. "Despite occasional suggestions that the lawyer's words are not proteCted, it
seems that they are and should be protected-certainly whenever their disclosure would
tend either directly or indirectly to reveal the client's confidences, and arguably elsewhere
as well." D. LOUISELL & c. MUELLER, supra note 8, at 738-39.
98. Id.
99. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
100. Id. at 403.
101. Id.
102. Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980)
(citing United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281-82 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
976 (1964».
103. 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 670-79
(1980).
104. "[T]he burden of establishing the existence of a privilege rests on the party as
serting it." Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994
(1980).
105. "[T]here is no privilege to refuse to appear before the grand jury." Id.
106. "[The attorney] must take the stand [before the grand jury] without previous
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lege generally does not excuse an attorney from appearing before a
grand jury, \07 despite claims by the criminal defense bar that the mere
fact of such an appearance can jeopardize an attorney-client
relationship. \08
An attorney may move to quash a grand jury subpoena under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c)\09 in advance of appearing
before the grand jury. However, the courts rarely grant such motions,
reasoning that it is usually impossible to know in advance of a grand
jury ~ppearance whether the questions that will be asked of an attor
ney will seek information protected by the attorney-client privilege. l \0
The "work product doctrine," endorsed by the Supreme Court in
restrictions..... He may, of course, initially refuse to answer questions he believes to be
protected by the attorney-client privilege. But a general ... assertion of the privilege is not
enough.... [He] must establish the elements of the privilege as to each record sought and
each question asked . . . ." Id. (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951»
(footnote omitted).
107...Generally, the procedure for asserting the attorney-client privilege before the
grand jury is as follows. When, for example, an attorney appears before a grand jury and
refuses to provide certain information on the basis that it is protected by the attorney-client
privilege, the prosecutor assisting the grand jury may challenge the claim of privilege. In
that case, "the party asserting the privilege submits the disputed document to the Court for
an in camera inspection along with an explanation as to how each particular document falls
within the privilege." In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center), 615 F. Supp.
958, 963 (D. Mass. 1985).
The federal circuits disagree on whether to allow an immediate appeal from a district
court ruling against a claim of attorney-client privilege. There is a general rule that a party
may not appeal a district court's denial of a motion to quash a subpoena without first
resisting the subpoena and being found in contempt. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323 (1940). However, in cases in which the subpoena is directed to a third party (in this
case the attorney), some courts have permitted an immediate appeal. The rationale is that
the third party, whose interests are not at stake, might tum the documents over rather than
risking the consequences of civil contempt. See, e.g. In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1
(Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, withdrawn on other grounds, 697 F.2d Il2 (4th Cir. 1982). But
see In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15 (1st Cir.) (requiring that subpoena recipient be held in
contempt of court before permitting appeal of adverse ruling of privilege), app. for stay
denied, 444 U.S. 1041 (1980).
108. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
109. See infra note 144 for the text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c).
110. "[O]ne cannot know precisely what will happen before the Grand Jury when
the lawyer appears. Movant may be correct ... that particular questions will be placed
which will offend [the attorney-client] privilege or status. That, we cannot know until the
question is voiced." In re Grand Jury Subpoena (John Doe, Attorney), No. 86-665, slip op.
at 2-3 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 1986) (available on Lexis, Genfed Library).
But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center), 615 F. Supp. 958 (D.
Mass 1985). There the court, although acknowledging that" 'blanket assertions of privi
lege ... are extremely disfavored,' " quashed grand jury subpoenas served on attorneys
without requiring an appearance before the grand jury or an in camera inspection because
the material requested in the subpoenas was clearly protected by the attorney-client privi
lege and the work product doctrine. Id. at 964 (quoting In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas),
695 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1982».
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Hickman v. Taylor III and applied by the Court to criminal cases in
United States v. Nobles,112 provides some additional protection to as
pects of the attorney-client relationship. The work product doctrine
and its concomitant privilege not to disclose relevant information pro
tects an attorney's written statements, private memoranda, personal
recollections and impressions generated in the course of preparing
legal advice or a defense for a client. ll3
The privilege not to testify (at trial or before a grand jury1l4)
based on the work product doctrine may be claimed by either the at
torney or the attorney's client. 115 As is the case with respect to the
attorney-client privilege, a party generally may not assert the work
product privilege in advance of an appearance before the grand jury.
As noted, the attorney-client privilege does not protect all aspects
of an attorney-client relationship. Federal courts have generally held
that certain basic information, including amounts and origins of fee
payments, and client identity, is unprotected. 116 Courts typically ex
plain this exemption on the grounds that information about fees (or
client identity) does not have the character of a confidential communi
cation a client makes to a lawyer to obtain informed legal advice.ll7
On rare occasions, courts have recognized at least one exception
to the general rule that "basic facts" do not fall within the parameters
of the attorney-client privilege. Courts have held that the identity of a
client or information about fee arrangements was protected when re
vealing that identity would necessarily reveal the content of confiden
tial communications from the client to the attorney.lIS In Baird v.
111. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
112. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
113. See generally, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-99 (1981); United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979).
114. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798 (3d. Cir.
1979).
115. "To the extent a client's interest may be affected, he, too, may assert the work
product privilege." Id. at 801 (footnote omitted).
116. "A wide range of basic facts, including the identity of the client, the fact that he
has retained or consulted a lawyer, the fee arrangement, and the general nature and dura
tion of services rendered by the lawyer, are generally not within the privilege." D. LOUl
SELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 8, at 771.
117. "[D)isclosure of the identity of the client and fee information stand on a footing
different from communications intended by the client to explain a problem to a lawyer in
order to obtain legal advice." In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 808-09 (3d Cir. 1984); In re
Grand Jury Witness (Waxman), 695 F.2d 359, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 217-19 (9th Cir. 1979). But see In re Osterhoudt, 722
F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983).
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Koerner,119 the court held privileged the identity of a client who had

retained an attorney to make an anonymous tax payment to the I.R.S.
The court reasoned that revealing the client's identity would have re
vealed the personal financial circumstances he had communicated to
his attorney, information that would normally be privileged. There
fore, the client's identity was privileged.
Subsequently, certain federal courts defined an "incrimination ra
tionale" as the basis for the holding in Baird. 120 These courts held
client identity and fee information privileged "where revealing that in
formation probably would incriminate a client on the same charges for
which the client sought legal assistance."121 This approach has been
criticized,122 and is a minority rule. Generally, the attorney who is
asked, "Who paid you and how much?" must provide that informa
tion, even if it incriminates a client and results in the attorney's dis
qualification from the case. 123
In addition to "gaps" in the attorney-client privilege, in some cir
cumstances an attorney may be required to reveal information that
would ordinarily be protected. Confidential communications ordina
rily shielded from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege lose their
protection when "the lawyer is consulted, not with respect to past
wrongdoing but to future illegal activities."124 According to Louisell
and Mueller, "[t]he [crime-fraud] exception [to the attorney-client
privilege] comes into play when the client knowingly seeks to advance
a criminal or fraudulent endeavor through consulation with coun
sel."125 The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, so the cli
ent's intention is the determinative factor: the attorney-client privilege
is forfeited even if the attorney has not knowingly participated in an
on-going criminal or fraudulent enterprise. 126 In In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (FMC),127 the court held that the crime-fraud exception
applies to documents otherwise protected by the work product doc
trine as well as those otherwise protected, by the attorney-client
119. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
120. In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
121. In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d at 361 (citing In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979».
122. See generally, Matter of Witnesses Before the Special March 1980 Grand Jury,
729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984).
123. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the results of
providing incriminating evidence against a client.
124. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979).
125. D. LOu/SELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 8, at 822.
126. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979).
127. 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979).
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privilege. 128
The crime-fraud exception comes into ,play only after the attor
ney-client privilege has been successfully invoked by the party seeking
to avoid disclosure. The government then has the burden of present
ing prima facie evidence of on-going criminal activity.129 "[O]nce the
privilege is overcome, the attorney must testify about all confidential
communications." 130
Professor David Fried and other commentators have argued that
the courts' decisions not to protect client identity and fee information
and their expansive treatment of the crime-fraud exception have sub
stantially eroded the protection the attorney-client relationship pro
vides.l3l For example, Professor Fried argues that federal courts have
expanded the crime-fraud exception by minimizing the government's
burden in making its prima facie showing, and by allowing use of the
contested evidence itself to provide proof of an on-going crime or
fraud.132 Equally important, Professor Fried points to the host of new
federal statutes that crimin'alize formerly noncriminal behavior. Ac
cording to Fried, the modern trend has been to consider prima facie
evidence of violations of these statutes a sufficient basis for invoking
the crime-fraud exception. As an example, Professor Fried cites the
RICO statutes, which criminalize the investment of racketeering en
terprise profits in legitimate businesses. In this situation, according to
Fried, an attorney's legal advice might not be protected, even though
the attorney w~s not aware of the source of the funds and the client
was not aware t~at his or her actions violated a criminal statute. 133
Thus, in Fried's view, the attorney called to appear before a grand jury
to provide evidence against his or her client may now have a dimin
128. See generally, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798 (3d
Cir. 1979). In FMC,. the corporate client claimed the protection of the work product doc
trine for documents prepared by its attorney. The court held that the crime-fraud excep
tion applied in these circumstances. However, the court also noted without deciding that
the result might be different if an attorney who unknowingly participated in a client's on
going criminal conduct, claimed the doctrine's protection. Id. at 802 n.5.
129. "If ... the crime was a continuing one, or one that occurred after the firm was
consulted, then the prima facie showing made by the government would suffice to allow
inspection by the grand jury." Id. at 803.
130. Fried, supra note 63, at 474.
131. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 63; Stern & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1796-1804;
Silbert, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doc
trine, the Lawyer's Obligations of Disclosure, and the Lawyer's Response to Accusation of
Wrongful Conduct, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 351 (1986).
132. Fried, supra note 63, at 469.
133. Id. at 471-72.
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ished ability to raise the most significant traditional defense shielding
their private communications.
As Fried notes, the narrow view the federal courts have taken of
the attorney-client privilege flows logically from the instrumental justi
fication for the privilege. 134 He advances an alternative justification
for the privilege which he calls the "intrinsic value" justification. 135
He argues that the attorney-client privilege protects the relationship of
trust between a client and his or her attorney and that an attorney is
morally obligated to protect the client's confidences. 136 "There is little
moral difference between convicting a client by testimony compelled
from his or her own mouth and convicting a client by testimony com
pelled from his or her attorney's mouth. This view ... is probably the
view held by most working attorneys."137
While Fried ties the "intrinsic value" justification for the privilege
primarily to moral values and to the. constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination, 138 other commentators have advanced instrumental
justifications for a more generous approach to the attorney-client priv
ilege on the basis of the lawyer's role in an adversarial criminal justice
system. 139
These commentators urge that for lawyers to represent their cli
ents effectively, full and frank communication between lawyer and cli
ent is necessary. 140 The increasing complexity of federal statutory law
and the tendency to criminalize behavior which would formerly have
merited only civil penalties makes the advice of counsel a necessity
rather than a luxury.141
It is also argued that protecting the attorney-client relationship
will advance the truth-finding process performed by courts. In an ad
134. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
135. Fried, supra note 63, at 490-92.
136. Professor Fried is not alone in his view. See, e.g., Sterk, Testimonial Privileges:
An Analysis of Horizontal Choice of Law Problems, 61 MINN. L. REV. 416 (1977); Krat
tenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules ofEvidence: A Sug
gested Approach, 64 GEO. L. J. 163 (1976); M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 1-9 (1975).
137. Fried, supra note 63, at 492.
138. See Fried, supra note 63, at 490-92.
139. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
(1975); D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 8, at 730-34; Sterk, supra note 135; Stem
& Holfman, supra note 3, at 1826-27.
140. See, e.g., D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 8, at 731.
141. Fried, supra note 63, at 475; Stem & Holfman, supra note 3, at 1826. The
RICO statute is the best known example of a statute which sweeps a wide variety of for
merly noncriminal behavior into its net. The unpredictable nature of RICO liability sug
gests why it may be impossible for an attorney to confidently advise a client ahead of time
which information imparted by the client can or cannot be kept confidential.
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versary proceeding, a defense attorney must vigorously advance his or
her client's position, and the ability to do SQ will often depend on ac
cess to all the facts.142
Finally, the unregulated use of attorney subpoenas carries with it
the risk that their use will not be restricted to situations in which es
sential information can only be obtained from an attorney. Attorney
subpoenas may be used in litigation in part because there is a chance
that opposing counsel will be rendered less effective or even disquali
fied. 143 Undermining the effectiveness of a criminal defendant's de
fense by attacking the opposing attorney does not seem an appropriate
tactic in a process which has as its goal the discovery of truth.
The debate between the defense bar and the government concern
ing attorney subpoenas is in part a second debate about the scope of
and justification for the attorney-client privilege. The "intrinsic
value" approach to the privilege, which elevates the obligation to pro
tect one's client over the obligation as an officer of the court to reveal
potentially incriminating information, is probably a fair description of
the position most members of the defense bar take in response to the
government's increased use of attorney subpoenas.
B.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c)

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c)l44 provides a proce
dure for challenging subpoenas requiring the recipient to provide evi
dence at trial or before a grand jury.145 By its terms, the rule applies
142. Stern & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1826-27.
-143. "The unregulated power·to-subpoena attorneys also carries with it the-potential
for mischief inherent in any situation where one adversary can pummel his opponent with
out violating the rules." American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section, Report to the
House of Delegates 13 (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter 1988 A.B.A. Report].
144. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) reads:
For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects. A subpoena may also
command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, docu
ments or other objects designated therein. The Court on motion made promptly
may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or
oppressive.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
145. Alternatively, an attorney might simply ignore the subpoena, in which case the
government must resort to contempt proceedings to enforce it. Under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 17(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1826, federal district courts have the responsibil
ity for enforcing grand jury subpoenas.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g) reads in part:
Contempt. Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena
served upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the sub
poena issued.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g).
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to subpoenas duces tecum; however, courts have on occasion adapted
the rule and applied it to subpoenas ad testificandum. 146 An attorney
Section 1826 reads in part:
(a) Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or
grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply
with an order of the court to testify or provide other information . . . the
court, upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention,
may summarily order his confinement ... until such time as the witness is
wiIIing to give such testimony or provide such information....
(b) Any appeal from an order of confinement ... shall be disposed of as soon as
practicable . . . .
28 U.S.c. § 1826 (1982).
The court in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975), interpreted these provisions together, along with the
relevant legislative history, to mean that Congress had codified existing civil contempt pro
cedure and that a subpoena was not, for contempt purposes, self-executing. In other words,
the statutes require an adversarial hearing at which the potential witness has the opportu
nity to present defenses against enforcement of the subpoena before the witness is found in
civil contempt of court. Id. at 88.
A witness's defenses to the grand jury subpoena at a contempt proceeding are essen
tially the same as the substantive bases for motions to quash subpoenas under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 17(c). Thus, among the defenses available to a recalcitrant witness
are that the subpoena is unduly broad or that it seeks irrelevant material. Id. at 91. Gener
ally, in contempt proceedings, the defendant has the burden of proving why the subpoena
at issue should not be enforced. See generally, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Hill), 786
F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1986); In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1980).
However, in Schofield, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals established what has been
termed "the Schofield rule": when the government seeks enforcement of a subpoena by the
court, it must make a preliminary showing that "each item is at least relevant to an investi
gation being conducted by the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and is not
sought primarily for another purpose." Schofield, 486 F.2d at 93. The court shifted the
burden to the government because, given the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, all relevant
information regarding the purpose of the subpoena is in the government's hands. The court
reasoned that a potential witness could almost never meet the burden of proving the irregu
larity of a subpoena. Id. at 92. The court based its decision on its supervisory power over
grand juries, and on "the federal courts' . . . supervisory power over civil proceedings
brought in the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1826(a)." Id. at 93.
No other circuit has adopted the Schofield rule, although the First Circuit considered
it favorably in 1980. See In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1980). However, because
the issues raised in a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena are similar to those raised
when a potential witness defends him- or herself in a contempt proceeding against enforce
ment of a grand jury subpoena, several courts of appeals have considered or adopted the
Schofield rule in the context of motions under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) to
quash grand jury subpoenas. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d
968 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'd en bane, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986);
In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, withdrawn on other grounds,
697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982).
146. Although the rule explicitly refers to "production of documentary evidence and
objects," courts have considered motions under Rule 17(c) challenging subpoenas requiring
testimony. "Although commentators have indicated that the better practice is to require
the witness to appear and claim any privilege or immunity he or she may have, courts have
repeatedly, when the interests ofjustice have so warranted, heard and granted (and denied)
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who receives a subpoena to testify before a grand jury about a client's
confidential communications-whether committed to paper or not
can attempt a Rule 17(c) challenge to the subpoena, based on the at
torney-client privilege, in advance of appearing before the grand jury.
However, as previously indicated, courts typically require the party
claiming the privilege to appear before the grand jury. 147
Rule 17(c) authorizes a court to quash a subpoena that is "unrea
sonable or oppressive." In theory, at least, the rule appears to offer an
attorney faced with a grand jury subpoena some substantive protection
from testifying in addition to the protection provided by the attorney
client privilege. In practice, however, the federal courts' interpreta
tion of "unreasonable or oppressive" results in very little protection.
As the moving party, an attorney has the burden of proving the
subpoena unreasonable or oppressive,148 and the burden is extremely
difficult to meet. 149 Orfield's Criminal Procedure Under the Federal
Rules ISO describes as follows the limitations on grand jury subpoenas:
"[A grand jury subpoena] must not be too broad ... the documents
sought must have some materiality to the investigation, it must be lim
ited to a reasonable time .... A subpoena may not be used to secure
privileged documents...."151
Grand jury subpoenas have been quashed as "too broad" only
when an extremely large volume of material was subpoenaed ls2 and a
subpoena covering any period of time up to ten years has generally
motions to quash subpoenas to compel testimony." United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp.
117, 123 (D. Mass. 1986) (citing Amsler v. United States, 381 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1967);.
Matter of Archuleta, 432 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Pack, 150 F.
Supp. 262 (D. Del. 1957); In re National Window Glass Workers, 287 F. 219 (N.D. Ohio
1922».
147. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings: Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 827 F.2d 301
(8th Cir. 1987). "The grand jury's proceedings are entitled to a presumption of regularity,
and one challenging a grand jury subpoena has the burden of showing irregularity." Id. at
304 (citation omitted).
149. "[T]he overwhelming majority of witnesses comply [with grand jury subpoenas]
without much trouble, for in reality they have few legal defenses." M. FRANKEL & G.
NAFTALIS, supra note 21, at 20.
150. 2 ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES (M. Rhodes
2d ed. 1985).
151. Id. at 754-55.
152. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings: Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 827 F.2d 301 (8th
Cir. 1987) (court refused to quash subpoena on the basis of overbreadth that asked for
records of all money orders totalling more than $1,000 sent from a particular Western
Union office between January, 1984 and February, 1986). The court suggested that a chal
lenge for overbreadth on the basis of the fourth amendment would succeed only if it
threatened the operations of the subpoenaed business. Id. at 304.
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been considered reasonable. 153 It is apparent that these two limita
tions on grand jury subpoenas are rarely pertinent when an attorney
receives a grand jury subpoena. Attorneys' objections to these subpoe
nas are not based on the volume of material sought by the government,
but on their destructive effect on the attorney-client relationship.154
Similarly, the lower federal courts have not applied a stringent
standard of relevancy and materiality to grand jury subpoenas. "Rele
vance and materiality necessarily are terms of broader content in their
use as to a grand jury investigation than in their use as to the evidence
of a trial. ... [The grand jury] obviously has a right ... to a fair
margin of reach. . .. Some exploration or fishing necessarily is inher
ent and entitled to exist in all . . . productions sought by a grand
jury."155 In United States v. Dionisio,156 the Supreme Court reasoned
that it may be impossible to know in advance whether particular evi
dence is relevant to a grand jury investigation in progress, and that the
grand jury must be left free to pursue all leads. 157
Although some federal courts were initially responsive, appeals
made during the 1980's by attorneys seeking to expand the protection
offered by Rule 17(c) were generally unsuccessful. In In re Special
Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey),158 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that when an attorney is subpoenaed to provide information
about his client, "attorney-client privilege considerations and sixth
amendment interests arise automatically and a preliminary showing
[of need and relevance] must be made by the government before the
attorney can be forced to appear before the grand jury."159 In effect,
the court created a standard that limited. the investigatory powers of
the grand jury and placed the burden of proof for justifying use of an
attorney subpoena on the government. l60 The basis for the court's
power to impose this requirement on the government was the court's
153. In Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
833 (1956), the court quashed a subpoena calling for all an attorney's files, records and
correspondence during a ten-year period. However, in Matter of Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975), the court upheld a subpoena covering all a law
firm's financial records during a 5-year period.
154. See supra notes 61-88 and accompanying text.
155. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 862-63 (8th Cir. 1956).
156. 410 U.S. 1 (1972).
157. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 15-16. Quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273,282
(1919), the Court reiterated that "[n]o grand jury witness is 'entitled to set limits to the
investigation that the grand jury may conduct.''' Id. at 15.
158. 676 F.2d 1005, withdrawn on other grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982).
159. Id. at 1010.
160. Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975».
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"exercise of [its] supervisory power over federal grand jury proceed
ings in this circuit."161 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals initially
followed Harvey in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe. 162
Subsequently, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting
en bane, reversed the panel decision. 163 Because the Harvey decision
was withdrawn, the opinion is not controlling in the Fourth Circuit. 164
Other circuits have considered the issue and declined to follow
Harvey. 165
Defense attorneys faced with grand jury subpoenas made one gain:
in the substantive protection provided by Rule 17(c). In In re Grand
Jury Matters,166 the district court quashed federal grand jury subpoe
nas issued to five criminal defense attorneys whose clients were under
grand jury investigation for drug and tax offenses. 167 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. the district court on the basis that the tim
ing of the subpoenas interfered unreasonably with the attorneys' abil
ity to prepare their clients' defense before the state court.168 In doing'·
so, the court affirmed that the district court's power under 17(c) to"
quash "unreasonable and 'oppressive" subpoenas was not limited to
considerations of breadth, relevance, and privilege. 169 Courts in other
circuits appear prepared to follow In re Grand Jury Matters, although
with considerable caution. 170
161. Id. at 1012.
162. 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985). The holding may have been somewhat narrower
than the holding in Harvey, in that the burden apparently would have been shifted only if
the subpoenaed attorney would be disqualified from representing his or her client if he or
she testified before the grand jury. Id. at 975.
163. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1985),
eert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
164. The panel decision was withdrawn when Leon Harvey became a fugitive. See
In re Special Grand Jury 81-1 (Harvey), 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982). In In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1985), eerr. denied, 475 U.S. 1108
(1986), the court noted that prior to withdrawal of the Harvey opinion, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals had ordered a rehearing en bane of the case. In an unpublished opinion
by Judge Murnaghan, United States V. Morchower, No. 83-1816 (4th Cir. Sept. 28, 1983),
he declined to follow Harvey, stating that in his opinion, the Fourth Circuit grant of a
rehearing en bane meant that the Harvey opinion would have been reversed. See In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d at 247 n.4.
165. See supra note 10 for circuits declining to follow Harvey.
166. 593 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984).
167. In re Grand Jury Matters, 593 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.H. 1984).
168. In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d at 17.
169. Id. at 18-19.
170. See United States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1988) (court re-·
fused to adopt per se rule that post-indictment grand jury subpoena was "unreasonable or
oppressive"); In re Grand Jury Investigation, John Doe 1078, 690 F. Supp. 489, 493 n.9
(E.D. Va. 1988) (In re Grand Jury Matters cited as authority for the proposition that courts
must inquire whether compliance with a subpoena is too burdensome); In re Grand Jury
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In sum, during the last decade, the courts have generally rejected
defense attorneys' attempts to establish broad protection for their rela
tionships with their clients. Heeding Professor Wigmore, the courts
have retained a traditional, narrow interpretation of the attorney-cli
ent privilege. Following the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts
have been reluctant to use their supervisory power over the grand jury
to expand the legal defenses available to a subpoena recipient under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure l7(c). Yet despite the refusal to
adopt broad reform by judicial fiat, there is in the legal community a
general consensus that, "except in narrowly defined circumstances, it
is improper for a prosecutor to subpoena a lawyer in order to investi
gate the lawyer's client."171
C.

The Department of Justice's Internal Attorney Subpoena
Guidelines

The Justice Department itself stated, in its 1985 guidelines on
subpoenas to attorneys, that attorney subpoenas should be used spar
ingly.172 The Department of Justice guidelines restrict the use of at
torney- subpoenas if such information is available from another
source.173 The guidelines appear to limit the use of subpoenas for
Subpoena Misc. No. 86-027, 626 F. Supp. 1319, 1332 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (citing In re Grand
Jury Matters for proposition that court has the power to quash. subpoenas that are unrea
sonable or oppressive); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985
(Robert M. Simels, Esq.), 605 F. Supp. 839, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court held that the
subpoena being contested would not interfere unduly with attorney's preparation of his
'.
client's case).
171. United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 672 (1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J.
dissenting).
172. The United States Attorneys' Manual contains extensive guidelines concern
ing the issuance of such subpoenas. For instance, before iss~ing a subpoena for an
attorney to appear before a grand jury, a federal prosecutor must determine, inter
alia, that the 'information sought is reasonably needed for t,he successful comple
tion of the investigation or prosecution' (§ 9-2.161(a)(F)(l); that 'all reasonable
attempts' were made 'to obtain the information from alternative sources' (§ 9
2.161(a)(B»; that the 'need for the information ... outweigh[s] the potential ad
verse effects upon the attorney-client relationship,' including the 'risk that the
attorney will be disqualified' (§ 9-2.161(a)(F)(4»; and that '[t]he information
sought [is] not protected by a valid claim ofpriviIege' (§ 9-2.161(a)(F)(6». Before
issuing a subpoena to an attorney, a federal prosecutor must also first obtain ap
proval from the Assistant Attorney General in charge ofthe}ustice Department's
Criminal Division.
United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 657 n.19 (1st Cir. 1987).
173. However, the provision is qualified: there is no obligation to use the alternate
source if the effort to do so would inhibit the investigation or compromise later attempts to
obtain the information from the attorney. D.O.J. GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at § 9
2.161(a).
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"fishing expeditions," 174 and they flatly prohibit subpoenas directed at
information "protected by a valid claim of privilege."175 Finally, in a
provision that raises ethical concerns for both parties to the transac
tion, the guidelines require a prosecutor to make "[a]ll reasonable at
tempts ... to voluntarily obtain information from an attorney before
issuing a subpoena to an attorney for information relating to the repre
sentation of a client."176
In an article published before the guidelines were issued,177 one
commentator argued that the best (or at least the most feasible) solu
tion to the attorney subpoena problem was the adoption of voluntary
guidelines modelled on those the Department of Justice promulgated
in 1970 to govern subpoenas issued to journalists. 178 However, other
commentators have criticized as ineffective an approach that relies on
prosecutors to police themselves. 179 The principle criticism directed at
the attorney subpoena guidelines is their unenforceability: "These
guidelines ... do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party."180 The
decision whether to issue an attorney subpoena remains with the gov
ernment and no "neutral" party has the power to review that deci
sion. 181 Stem and Hoffman, authors of a 1988 article on attorney
subpoenas,182 noted several additional problems with the Justice De
partment guidelines: (1) the guidelines contain no disclosure provision
so that it is impossible to know whether they are being complied with;
(2) the guidelines distinguish between privileged and nonprivileged in
174. "[T]here must be reasonable grounds to believe a crime has been or is being
committed .... Subpoenas shall be narrowly drawn and directed at material information
and shall cover a reasonable period of time." Id. at §§ 9-2.l61(a)(F)(I); 9-2.161(a)(F)(5).
175. Id. at § 9-2. 161(a)(F)(6).
176. Id. at § 9-2. 161(a)(C). The anticipation of a grand jury subpoena clearly places
an attorney in an ethical dilemma similar to the one caused by receipt of a SUbpoena. If the
attorney voluntarily furnishes information antithetical to a client's interests, he or she may.
have to withdraw from representation. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
When a defense attorney is asked to voluntarily provide information that may be damaging
to a client, the attorney's interests are placed in conflict with those of the client's. An
attorney's interests would be best served by furnishing information and avoiding a grand
jury subpoena; the client's would be best served by the attorney's resistence.
177. Weiner, supra note 3.
178. Id. at 125. The journalist subpoena guidelines are codified at 28 C.F.R. § 50,10
(1984).
179. See Stern & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1819; Comment, An Ethical/Legal T.ug
of War, supra note 3, at 376.
180. 0.0.1. GUIDELINES, supra note II, at § 9-2.161(a).
181. See supra note 79 for a summary of Professor Genego's discussion of the effect
on the adversary system of giving the government unilateral control over the identity of its
opponent.
182. Stern & Hoffman, supra note 3.
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formation, permitting prosecutors to take advantage of the Depart
ment of Justices's restrictive view of the attorney-client privilege; and
(3) the guidelines give prosecutors too much flexibility in determining
whether it is feasible to seek the information from a source other than
an attorney.IS3 The Department of Justice's own statistics indicate
that even after implementation of the guidelines, a substantial number
of attorney subpoenas continue to be issued. ls4

D.' An Alternative Approach: An Ethical Rule Governing
Prosecutorial Conduct
In 1985, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, at the urging
of the Massachusetts Bar Association, adopted Rule 3:08, Prosecution
Function f5 (PF 15) into its rules concerning the ethics and practice of
law. The rule reads:
It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to subpoena an attor
ney to a grand jury without prior judicial approval in circumstances
where the prosecutor seeks to compel the attorney/witness to pro
vide evidence concerning a person who is represented by the attor
ney/witness. ISS

Even before the rule took effect, federal prosecutors filed suit in Mas
sachusetts District Court "seeking both a declaratory judgment that
the rule [wa]s invalid as applied to them and an injunction against its
enforcement."IS6 The challenge did not succeed. In United States v.
183. Id. at 1819-20.
184. In the 1988 Report accompanying a resolution on attorney subpoenas presented
to the A.B.A.'s House of Delegates, the A.B.A. reported that "[u]nfortunately, despite [the
A.B.A.'s 1986] resolution [on attorney subpoenas], the problem has grown substantially
worse. In the 7 months preceding the existing resolution, according to Department of Jus
tice statistics, approximately 170 federal grand jury subpoenas were issued to attorneys for
information about a client .... In the 13 months immediately after the existing resolution
was approved (March 1, 1986-March 31,1987), approximately 525 federal grand jury and
trial subpoenas were issued to attorneys for information about a client." 1988 A.B.A. Re
port, supra note 143, at 3.
185. MASS. SUP. JUD. Cr. R. 3:08, PF 15.
The 1111e, which took effect in the Massachusetts court system on January 1, 1986, was
the first of its kind passed by any state. Stern & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1821-22 note
that two states' have since followed suit: in 1987, the Supreme Courts in Virginia and
Tennessee adopted rules similar to PF 15. However, these rules have not been adopted by
the federal district courts sitting in Virginia and Tennessee. Six other states and the Dis
trict of Columbia have considered the adoption of a similar rule .
. 186. United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117, 118 (D. Mass. 1986). In most
cases, a court rule adopted by a state court would not affect the operation of the federal
courts sitting in that state. However, in Massachusetts, as in many states, the federal dis
trict court has used its local rulemaking power to adopt for its own use the ethical rules of
the Supreme Judicial Court. Arguably, when the Supreme Judicial Court adopted PF 15,
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Klubock,187 the district court and subsequently the First Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed PF 15 as a valid local court rule.
1.

The District Court Opinion 188

In its challenge to PF 15, the government contended that the rule
was invalid 189 because it conflicted directly with the provisions of Fed
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a)190 governing the issuance of
subpoenas. The government also contended that the rule frustrated a
federal policy, which the government argued was embodied generally
in Rule 17, of restricting judicial oversight of the grand jury's sub
poena power.
In rejecting these arguments, the court began by ascribing a su
pervisory power of considerable breadth over grand jury process and
procedure to the federal district courts. 191 The limit on this power,
the court explained, was that it must not be exercised arbitrarily, nor
could the district courts interfere with the grand jury's subpoena
the statutory scheme mandated that, absent a specific district court rule to the contrary, PF
IS applied to federal prosecutors. Any ambiguity on this point was cleared up later in
1986, when the Judicial Council for Massachusetts explicitly adopted SJC Rule 3:08 in its
entirety in Local Rule 5(d)(4)(B). See supra note 14 for the text of Rule 5(d)(4)(B).
187. 639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir.), aff'd en bane,
832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987).
188. United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1986).
189. Federal prosecutors argued that PF IS was either invalid under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 57, or alternatively that it violated the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57 permits district courts to pro
mulgate local court rules of procedure as long as those local rules are consistent with the
federal rules of procedure. See infra note 216 for the text of Rule 57. The supremacy
clause of the Constitution provides that federal law takes precedenc~ over state law in the
event of direct conflict between the two.
In either case, the argument remains essentially that PF IS conflicts with existing
federal law and is therefore invalid.
190. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a) reads in part:
(a) For Attendance of Witnesses; Form; Issuance. A subpoena shall be issued by
the clerk under the seal of the court. It shall state the name of the court and
the title, if any, of the proceeding, and shall command each person to whom it
is directed to attend and give testimony at the time and place specified
therein. The clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed and sealed but otherwise in
blank to a party requesting it, who shall fill in the blanks before it is served.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a).
191. The court quoted In re National Window Glass Workers, 287 F. 219 (N.D.
Ohio 1922): "A supervisory duty ... is imposed upon the court to see that its grand jury
and its process are not abused, or used for purposes of oppression and injustice." Id. at
225. Also cited was Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp.
1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976) in which the court stated that "the District Court's supervisory power
over the grand jury is not limited to granting relief from unreasonable and oppressive grand
jury process. Rather, it extends ... to granting relief from any type of grand jury abuse."
Id. at IllS (footnote omitted).
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power by expanding the scope of existing testimonial privileges or by
creating new ones. 192 PF 15 did not expand the attorney:client privi
lege by creating new substantive grounds for quashing grand jury sub
poenas. Therefore, the judicial review mandated by the rule was a
justifiable exercise of a court's supervisory power over grand jury pro
cess as long as the rule did not conflict with federal rules of procedure
or violate federal policy.
The court quickly disposed of the argument that PF 15 conflicted
with Rule 17(a)'s provisions for issuance of grand jury subpoenas.
Rule '17(a), 193 the court pointed out, governs the issuance of subpoe
nas, while PF 15 governs their service. The 'rule permits a subpoena to
be issued; it simply prohibits service of an attorney subpoena prior to
judicial approval. Thus, the two rules "peacefully" co-exist. 194
More significant was the government's contention that the ab
sence of provisions in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure man
dating judicial supervision of grand jury subpoenas represented a
policy choice on the part of the rulemakers and Congress. Relying on
analogous provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the gov
ernment argued there was a conscious policy choice to minimize, or at
least to regulate, judicial involvement in the subpoena process. 195 The
government argued further that rulemakers intended Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 17(c), 196 governing motions to quash subpoenas,
to be the sole means of quashing a grand jury subpoena. 197
In response, the court reasoned that Rule 17, which governs sub
poenas at all stages of a criminal prosecution, is too general and minis
192. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 120 (quoting In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13,
18 (1st Cir. 1984».
193. See supra note 190.
194. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 122.
195. The government argued that the history of Civil Rule of Procedure 45, which
governs the issuance of subpoenas in civil cases, revealed an intent by the drafters of Fed
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 to minimize judicial involvement in the subpoena pro
cess. Specifically, the government pointed to Civil Rule 45(d), which governs the issuance
of subpoenas for taking depositions. The civil rule originally required court approval
before the use of such a subpoena. The requirement was deliberately deleted from Rule
45(d) and does not appear in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17. On the basis of this
omission, the government argued that there existed a general policy to minimize or -to
regulate judicial involvement in the subpoena process. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 122.
In response, the court pointed out that taking into account all the provisions of Rule
17, courts exercise greater control of depositions in criminal cases than in civil cases. Be
cause judicial approval was required for issuance of all depositions in criminal cases, it was
unnecessary to have an additional requirement for judicial approval of deposition subpoe
nas requesting documents. Id. at 123.
196. See supra note 144 for the text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c).
197. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 123.
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terial in nature to define the entire extent of a district court's
supervisory power over grand jury subpoenas. As proof that Rule
17(c) is subject to adaptation by the courts, the court noted that
although the rule by its terms applies only to subpoenas duces tecum,
courts have "repeatedly, when the interests of justice have so war
ranted, heard and granted (and denied) motions to quash subpoenas to
compel testimony."198
In conclusion, the court considered whether PF 15 frustrated
general federal policies prom9ted by Rule 17. Looking to decisional
rather than statutory law as the source of federal policy, the court
reasoned that PF 15 would not "deprive the grand jury of any person's
evidence to an extent not previously permitted under federal law" 199
because it did not create or distort existing testimonial pt,ivileges. Nor
had the government carried its burden of persuading the court that PF
15 would delay grand jury work, given the constraints on attorney
. subpoenas imposed by the Department of Justice's own guidelines. 2°O
2.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals Opinions201

The government appealed the district court's refusal to grant a
declaratory injunction that PF 15 should not apply to federal prosecu
tors. Judge Torruella, writing for a majority of the First Circuit Court
of Appeals, initially affirmed the district court's decision. On rehear
ing en bane, the court divided three-to-three. The procedural effect
was affirmance of the district ~ourt decision.. In theoretical terms, the
split revealed differing assumptions about PF 15's reach.
On appeal, the government opposed the validity ofPF 15 on three
grounds: first, that PF 15 was beyond the rulemaking power of the
district court; second, that the supremacy clause barred enforcement
of the· rule against federal prosecutors, and third, that PF 15 was so
lacking in sound policy that the appellate court should use its supervi
sory power to invalidate the rule.
The court dismissed as moot the argument that PF 15 was a state
law in conflict with federal law. When the Judicial Council of Massa
chusetts explicitly adopted Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:08 in its
entirety,202 PF 15 became "as much federal law as if enacted initially
198. Id.
199. Id. at 124.
200. Id. at 125. See supra notes 172-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Department of Justice guidelines on attorney subpoenas.
201. United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 (lst Cir.), aff'd en bane, 832 F.2d 664
(1st Cir. 1987).
202. Before the case reached appellate review, the Judicial Council of the Massachu
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by the district court. "203
Turning to the rulemaking power of the district court, Judge Tor
ruella described it as limited to promulgating procedural (rather than
substantive) rules that do not conflict with existing federal rules of
procedure or with federal statutes. 204 More important, the power of
district courts to promulgate ethical rules governing the conduct of
their members could not be doubted. 20s Judge Torruella then noted
the ethical problems an attorney subpoena creates: (1) the subpoena
immediately chills an attorney-client relationship; (2) the subpoena
creates a conflict of interest for the attorney; (3) the attorney's energies
are diverted from the client's case to litigating a motion to quash the
subpoena; (4) the attorney, as a possible witness, may be disqualified
from representing his or her client;206 and (5) use of an attorney sub
poena gives a prosecutor potential control over the identity of oppos
ing counsel. 207 Reasoning that these problems were fundamentally
ethical, Judge Torruella stated that the district courts, rather than
Congress or the Supreme Court, were the appropriate parties to re
dress the problem. 208 .
Turning to the alleged conflict with federal law, Judge Torruella
adopted the district court's two findings. First, because PF 15 gov
erned the service rather than the issuance of subpoenas, it did not con
flict with existing federal law. 209 Second, the fact that courts had
adapted Rule 17(c)'s procedures governing subpoenas duces tecum to
cases involving subpoenas ad testificandum proved that Rule 17 did
setts District Court amended Local Rule 5(d)(4)(B) to explicitly incorporate Supreme Judi
cial Court Rule 3:08, PF !S.
203. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 at 651.
204. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 at 652 (citing Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973);
Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140 (1st Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Manhat
tan Ry., 289 U.S. 479 (1933».
205. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664 at 652-53.
206. Noting that PF 15 would operate in the context of established attorney-client
relationships and that attorney testimony before a grand jury could irreparably damage an
attorney-client relationship, Judge Torruella indicated that the sixth amendment right to
choice of counsel was implicated in these situations. That a prosecutor could to some
extent control the identity of an accused's attorney also implicated the fifth amendment's
due process requirement. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 at 653-54.
207. Id.
208. "The ethical relationships between courts, attorneys and their clients, although
obviously of interest to Congress and the Supreme Court, have been left traditionally to the
primary regulation of the courts before whom those problem [sic] arise." Id. at 654-55. In
addition, "[w]e believe that district courts are in a better position to judge, in the first
instance and absent abuse of discretion, what is the appropriate response to this problem."
Id. at 657.
209. Id. at 655-56.
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not define the limits of a court's power with respect to grand jury
subpoenas. 210
In closing, Judge Torruella refused the government's request to
use its supervisory power to strike PF 15 down as an unwise example
of local rulemaking. He stated that "[i]n our view PF 15, rather than
constituting an abuse of discretion, is a limited, reasonable response to
what appears to be a mounting professional problem."211
The two opinions dissenting from the district court's affirmance
of PF 15 did so on analytically distinct grounds. Chief Judge Camp
bell expressed the view that the rule, which operated in a highly sensi
tive context, exceeded the rulemaking power of a district court. 212
Finding both a conflict with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
17(a) and a procedural change that verged on the substantive,213 Judge
Campbell would have invalidated PF 15. The Chief Judge described
the supervisory power of the federal courts over the grand jury as "his
torically" too limited to encompass the function prescribed by PF 15,
absent authorization from Congress or the Supreme Court.214 He
210. Id.
211. Id. at 657.
212. In Judge Campbell's view, the inquiry concerning a conflict with PF 15 and
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 could not be limited to finding that there was no
literal conflict between the two provisions. He cited Supreme Court decisions in Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (identity of journalists' sources not protected from grand
jury investigation by first amendment); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (be
cause the grand jury's requirement of voice exemplars did not violate fourth or fifth amend
ment privileges, no showing of need by government was required before subpoenas were
enforced); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919) (grand jury witness not entitled to
refuse testimony on grounds that grand jury lacks jurisdiction over the offense under inves
tigation); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (no requirement to give witness
Miranda warning before grand jury sought testimony about crime in which witness may
have been involved). Because these cases established the broad scope of grand jury investi
gations and prerogatives, Judge Campbell found that the absence of explicit provisions in
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 for judicial supervision of the issuance of grand jury
subpoenas implicitly prohibited such supervision. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 at 661-62.
In his view, a rule which "s[oughtJ to strike a new balance between the grand jury's
and the prosecutor's right of access to evidence and a defendant's right to the full protec
tion of his counsel" was beyond the scope of the rulemaking power granted to district
courts. Id. at 659 n.23. That power was, according to the Advisory Committee, granted to
the courts to regulate "matters of detail" such as the mode of impaneling a jury or selecting
a foreman for a jury. Id. at 659.
Judge Campbell stated that, in procedural terms, PF 15 would be a major innovation,
given the clearly established proposition that no one is entitled to the quashing of a grand
jury subpoena on the grounds of privilege in advance of appearing before the grand jury
and claiming the privilege. Id. at 659-60.
213. See Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 649-50 (1960) (local court rules should be
limited to matters that are procedural rather than substantive).
214. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 at 663.
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found PF IS's lack of standards for judicial approval of subpoenas
particularly disturbing. "Here, in PF 15, the district court has vested
completely uncanalized power to individual judges to 'approv[e]' at
torney subpoenas. The rule contains no principle, intelligible or other
wise, to guide these judges."215
Judge Breyer, in dissent, raised sua sponte the issue of a conflict
with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57. 216 In Judge Breyer's
view, the history of the rule's promulgation and adoption by the dis
trict court did not satisfy Rule 57's requirements of notice and oppor
tunity to comment for those affected by changes in local rules. 217
Therefore, PF 15 was invalid.
215. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664 at 669 (footnote omitted).
216. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57 reads in part:
Each district court ... may from time to time, after giving appropriate public
notice and an opportunity to comment, make and amend rules governing its prac
tice not inconsistent with these rules.... In all cases not provided for by rule, the
district judges and magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in which they act.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 57.
Rule 57 was amended in 1985 to require public notice and an opportunity to comment
for parties affected by rule changes.
217. Judge Breyer gave the following account of PF 15's promulgation:
On October 1, 1985, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court added PF 15 to
... its Rule 3:08.... [T]he federal district court was in the process of revising ...
its local rules, including Rule 5(d)(4)(B). On October 7, the district court circu
lated proposed revised rules for comment, including a revised Rule 5(d)(4)(B)
that was ambiguous as to whether or not it incorporated S.J.c. Rule 3:08 ....
The only commenter to discuss Rule 5(d)(4)(B) was the United States Attorney,
who asked the court to make clear that Rule 5(d)(4)(B) did not incorporate S.J.c.
Rule 3:08 .... [T]he Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ...
ask[ed] 'that the Government's request for an exemption be made public and that
the Court establish a period of time to receive comments' .... [T]he chief judge of
the district court said that the court would not issue any public notice because the
U.S. Attorney's filing of [the Klubock case] ... 'effectively mooted any need for
consideration of Local Rule 5(d)(4)(B)' until after a ruling ....
On March 19, 1986, the U.S. Attorney again asked the court to clarify Rule
5(d)(4)(B) by specifically excluding PF 15 ....
. . . [T]he court issued no further notice and set no additional period for
comment on Rule 5(d)(4)(B). Rather, the court issued its final revised rules on
June 27, 1986 ... explicitly incorporat[ing] Rule 3:08 and hence PF 15.
Klubock, 832 F.2d 664 at 674-75.
Judge Torruella responded to Judge Breyer by arguing that the initial version of Local
Court Rule 5(d)(4)(B) had not been ambiguous with respect to incorporation of S.J.c. Rule
3:08 and PF 15. In Judge Torruella's view, United States District Attorney Weld's actions
proved that Weld understood Rule 5(d)(4)(B) to incorporate S.J.C. Rule 3:08. Rather than
commenting on Rule 5(d)(4)(B), Weld sought an exemption from PF 15. "The United
States Attorney and his colleagues ... had notice and an opportunity to comment, but
rather than submit a detailed, substantive critique of PF 15, they sought a blanket exemp
tion from the rule." Id. at 666 (footnote omitted).
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Judge Breyer's objection was not simply procedural. Amended
Rule 57 was intended to enhance local rulemaking by giving those af
fected an opportunity to suggest alternatives or improvements to pro
posed rules. Judge Breyer raised numerous questions about the
operation of PF 15 which, he stated, could not be answered because
the merits and operation of PF 15 had not been properly discussed.
Among the questions he raised were: 1) what standard would a judge
use to review a proposed subpoena, 2) would the initial approval for
application take place ex parte, 3) would there be an avenue of appeal
from a refusal to grant initial approval for a subpoena, and 4) would a
subpoena served without prior judicial approval be invalid?218
In terms of the extent of a federal court's rulemaking power,
Judge Breyer expressed some agreement with Judge Campbell's view.
Citing Miner v. Atlass 219 for the proposition that district courts do not
have the power to effect "basic changes" through local rules, Judge
Breyer stated that if PF 15 were interpreted to require that a prosecu
tor make some preliminary showing of "need" or "relevance" before a
judge approved an attorney subpoena, promulgation of the rule might
be beyond the district court's power. 220
The litigation surrounding PF 15's debut in the Massachusetts
district courts left unanswered an intriguing question: what exactly
had been affirmed as a valid local court rule? Perhaps because the case
lacked the clarifying focus of a particular factual dispute, the discus
sion ofPF 15's operation was vague and even contradictory. As Judge
Breyer noted, among the issues that remain to be settled with respect
to the rule are important procedural questions, such as whether the
initial application for judicial approval will always take place ex parte
and what sanctions will be applied if a prosecutor violates PF 15. The
most significant questio~ left unanswered is the extent to which dis
trict court judges will screen prosecutorial applications for subpoenas,
and, if the scrutiny is significant, what criteria they will use to decide
whether a subpoena should be served.
To determine how PF 15 has affected existing federal procedure,
this comment next compares existing procedures for resisting a grand
jury subpoena under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) with
PF 15's procedural implications. It then examines possible criteria for
judicial approval of attorney subpoenas to determine which would be
helpful in achieving the rule's goal of increased protection for the at
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 673.
363 u.s. 641 (1960).
Klubock, 832 F.2d 664 at 673.
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tomey-client relationship. Finally, it examines the reach of district
court rulemaking power to determine whether that power can encom
pass the introduction of stringent standards of judicial oversight for
attorney sUbpoenas.

v.

A COMPARISON OF RULE 17(c) AND PF 15

To compare the service of grand jury subpoenas to attorneys
before and after PF 15's enactment, suppose again that B has been A's
client for two years. A and B have recently spoken over the phone
some twenty times on a variety of subjects, including advice from A to
B on tax matters and on the disposition of property. B is now the
target of a grand jury investigation. At the government's request, a
federal court has issued a grand jury subpoena221 requiring A to pro
duce her records of the telephone conversations and to testify to the
content of those conversations. The subject matter of most of the tele
phone conversations and A's notes recording her impressions of therri
might be protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-prod
.uct doctrine respectively, depending on whether A was providing legal
advice on all occasions. 222 A does not want to comply with the sub
poenas because she both desires and feels duty-bound to protect her
professional relationship with B from the range of threats her appear
ance before the grand jury might pose to that relationship.223 Further
more, assuming compliance with the subpoena would be against B's
interests, A has a professional obligation to resist. 224
Prior to PF 15's enactment, the course of litigation to quash A's
subpoena in the Massachusetts federal district courts was easy to pre
dict. On these facts, once the subpoena was served, A's 17(c) motion
to quash it for irrelevance or overbreadth would have been unsuccess
fuJ.225 If A's defense to the subpoena was based on the attorney-client
privilege and/or the work-product doctrine, she would almost cer
tainly have had to appear before the grand jury to assert her right not
221. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a) reads in part: "The clerk [of court]
shall issue a subpoena, signed and sealed but otherwise in blank to a party requesting it,
who shall fill in the blanks before it is served." FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a).
222. See supra notes 91-130 for a description of the parameters of the attorney-client
and the work-product privileges.
223. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
224. [T]he attorney has the duty, upon any attempt to require him to testify or
produce documents within the confidence, to make assertion of the [attorney
client] privilege, not merely for the benefit of the client, but also as a matter of
professional responsibility in preventing the policy of the law from being violated.
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 1956).
225. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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to testify. 226 If the prosecutor disputed the claim of privilege, A would
have had the burden of proof. Her claim would have succeeded if she
convinced the court, through argument and in camera inspection, that
all the material sought fell within the privileges' parameters. The gov
ernment would have had the opportunity to argue that the material
was not privileged. 227 If the district court denied A's claim of privi
lege, she would have had a right of appeal.
A.

PF 15 in its Present Form

The course of this litigation under PF 15 is less predictable,
although certain aspects are clear and certain assumptions seem
reasonable. 228
PF 15 is an ethical rule governing the conduct of prosecutors. 229
If the government served a subpoena on A without obtaining the prior
judicial approval PF 15 requires, A would not have grounds for dis
obeying the subpoena,23o nor would she have new substantive grounds
226. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 116-30 and accompanying text for a description of the excep
tions to the attorney-client and work-product privileges.
228. PF 15 does not distinguish between subpoenas duces tecum (requiring the pro
duction of documents) and subpoenas ad testificandum (requiring testimony) (..It is unpro
fessional conduct for a prosecutor to subpoena an attorney ... where the prosecutor seeks
to compel the attorney/witness to provide evidence...." MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:08, PF
15) and should probably be presumed to apply to both.
Subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum raise the same concerns in PF 15 situa
tions. Whether an attorney testifies or turns over documents, the process is likely to "chill"
the attorney-client relationship. Disqualification from a client's case could result from ver
bal testimony tending to prove the elements of an offense as easily as it could from docu
ments tending to prove the same thing. In either case, the attorney might find him- or
herself in the position of not being able to continue representing a client because his or her
testimony "[w]as or m[ight] be prejudicial to his client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(B) (1981) .
. With respect to subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum, PF IS may actually be
less ambiguous than Rule 17(c), which is sometimes applied by the courts to subpoenas ad
testificandum although its text seems limited to subpoenas duces tecum. See supra note 198
and accompanying text.
229. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court has adopted in its court rules
Disciplinary Rules Applicable to Practice as a Prosecutor or as a Defense Lawyer. See
generally, MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:08 (Disciplinary Rules Applicable to Practice as a
Prosecutor or as a Defense Lawyer).
"The rules ... regulate only such conduct of lawyers engaged in prosecution or de
fense activities as is designated 'unprofessional conduct,' that is, conduct which by these
rules is made subject to disciplinary sanctions." MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:08.
230. The First Circuit Court of Appeals writing to affirm PF 15 stated:
Attorneys are not, by virtue of such status, exempt from answering to subpoenas
when property served, including even when compliance has not been made with
provisions such as PF 15. The consequence of non-compliance with PF 15 is to be
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for a motion to quash under Rule 17(c).231 The only means of enforce
ment the rule provides is through disciplinary proceedings initiated by
the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers (on its own initiative or in
response to a complaint from A) and brought in a federal forum. 232
While disciplinary proceedings may have a deterrent effect,233 they are
a post facto remedy offering no additional protection to A and B's rela
tionship once a prosecutor decides to issue a subpoena.
However, since the Klubock litigation established that PF 15 ap
plies to federal prosecutors in Massachusetts, A is most likely to face a
situation in which the government complies· with PF 15's provisions.
The most important questions, then, are what the rule requires of
prosecutors and of the courts.
PF 15 requires that federal district courts 234 create a procedure
for prior judicial approval of attorney sUbpoenas. 235 The rule's lan
guage does not specify whether the proceeding should be adversarial
or ex parte. Although PF 15 was enacted to protect the attorney-cli
ent relationship, the rule does not contain standards to aid a court in
determining whether an attorney subpoena infringes impermissibly on
an attorney-client relationship, nor does it define the nature or extent
of the information a prosecutor must submit to a court to obtain the
requisite judicial approval. 236
resolved in different proceedings. Such non-compliance does not excuse disobedi
ence to lawful process.
Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 at 657.
231. According to the district court, "[PF IS] does not create a new right to judicial
review. Nor does it create new substantive grounds for quashing subpoenas." Klubock,
639 F. Supp. at 120 (footnote omitted).
232. "[A]s presently interpreted and enforced by the Massachusetts authorities, fed
eral prosecutors who are members of the Massachusetts bar are subject to PF IS only for
their actions within the District of Massachusetts, and in such cases, through disciplinary
action brought only in the federal forum." Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 at 651.
"Lawyer-discipline cases are prosecuted by [the Massachusetts Board of Bar Over
seers] office in federal as weJl as state courts, but heard by a panel offederal judges-rather
than the state's Board of Bar Overseers-when a lawyer's federal bar status is at issue."
NAT. L.J. 3, 42 (November 4, 1985).
233. "[PF IS] is a rule with teeth: it's [sic] violation may have most serious discipli
nary consequences for an individual prosecutor. It is the type of rule which can, quite
literally, affect an attorney's career should its mandate not be obeyed." In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, No. 86-738 at II (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 1986) (available at Westlaw cite 1986 WL
13539).
234. Of course, PF IS also applies to Massachusetts state courts. However, this
comment is confined to a consideration of PF IS in federal courts.
235. "That rule has two significant, but different, effects: (I) it teJls prosecutors to
apply to a court for prior approval of an attorney subpoena, and (2) it tells trial courts to
create a 'prior approval' procedure." Klubock, 832 F.2d 664 at 675 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
236. "[T]he impact of PF IS depends entirely upon the standards courts will impose
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The district court, the majority and the dissent, all noted in
Klubock that PF 15 does not define for the district courts any legal
standards for deciding whether to approve service of an attorney sub
poena. 237 Chief Judge Campbell refused to affirm PF IS's validity be
cause he considered its lack of standards a grant of power to district
court judges to "impose substantive limitations of [their] ... own de
vising"238 on the government's use of grand jury subpoenas.
In fact, it appears that federal district courts will proceed very
cautiously. The district court in Klubock stated that PF IS's require
ment of prior judicial approval "[did] not create a new right to judicial
review,"239 indicating that PF 15 did not create a duty in the district
court to question the propriety of a prosecutor's decision to subpoena
an attorney. The court's view of the very limited nature of judicial
review required by PF 15 was confirmed by its statement that "the
Schofield rule [requiring a prosecutor to demonstrate need and rele
vance before the court enforces a grand jury subpoena] ... plainly
imposes a heavier burden than does PF 15."240 While explicitly re
jecting the need and relevance showing Schofield imposed on the gov
ernment, the court did not suggest an alternative inquiry a district
court might conduct to fulfill a supervisory duty of preventing abuse of
grand jury process. 241
In re Grand Jury Subpoena (John Doe, Attorney) 242 provides ad
ditional insight into the district courts' probable treatment of PF 15.
John Doe was in-house counsel to a business under investigation by a
federal grand jury .. Doe received a subpoena served in compliance
on prosecutors prior to the issuance of subpoenas .... [T]he rule(,s language] ... left open
the rule's actual content." Gertner, supra note 71, at 43.
237. See Kluboek, 639 F. Supp. at 120 n.7; Kluboek, 832 F.2d 649 at 661 n.26;
Kluboek, 832 F.2d 664 at 667-69, 675.
238. Kluboek, 832 F.2d 649 at 661.
239. Kluboek, 639 F. Supp. at 120.
240. Id. at 125 n.14. See supra note 145.
241. Even United States District Attorney William Weld was uneasy with the dis
trict court's interpretation of PF 15:
Given that PF 15 itself identifies neither the standards to be applied nor the pro
cedures to be followed in obtaining judicial approval, the Court's assumptions
about what PF 15 does or does not create in the way of new substantive or proce
dural rights are indeed nothing more than assumptions. There is no basis on
which to determine that this amorphous rule actually means as little as the
Court's opinion assumes.
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration at 5, United States v.
Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir.), aff'd en bane,
832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987).
242. No. 86-665, slip op. (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 1986) (available on Lexis, Genfed
Library).
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with PF 15, requiring him to testify before the grand jury. The district
court approved the subpoena ex parte on the basis of a prosecutor's
affidavits indicating that no information protected by the attorney-cli
ent privilege was sought and that the line of inquiry contemplated
"would ... [not] interfere with relationship [sic] between the proposed
witness and his employer-client."243
In a subsequent motion to quash the subpoena, the potential wit
ness argued that the probable line of questioning would seek informa
tion protected by the attorney-client privilege and urged the court to
balance the prosecution's need for information against the possible
damage to his relationship with his employer. The court did not place
any additional burden on the prosecutor to justify use of the subpoena.
In addition, presumably out of concern for the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings, the court denied the potential witness access to the infor
mation the prosecutor had submitted to obtain judicial approval of the
subpoena. Because John Doe could not find out what line of question
ing the prosecutor planned to pursue, he lacked the factual basis for
his argument that the information the prosecutor planned to seek was
protected by the attorney-client privilege. 244 PF 15 thus gave the po
tential attorney/witness no more protection from the undesired grand
jury appearance than he would have had before its enactment.245
Judge Breyer, dissenting in Klubock, correctly noted that PF 15
can provide the additional protection to the attorney-client relation
ship envisioned by its sponsors only if the courts fashion new substan
tive standards to be applied to prosecutoria1.applications for attorney
subpoenas. 246 In the absence of explicit language in the rule establish
ing new protection for the attorney-client relationship, the district
courts have not fashioned any criteria on their own.
243.

Id. at 1.
244. Id. at 2-3.
245. It has even been suggested that PF 15 may have done a disservice to attorney
Doe and his employer. Doe's counsel in the case subsequently wrote about the litigation:
[T]he situation may well have been worse than pre-PF 15, when a court's percep
tion of the facts on a motion to quash was shaped by both sides, simultaneously,
in an adversary setting. In [this case], the prosecutor had an opportunity to paint
a picture virtually without rebuttal and was then asked to defend his actions
before the judge who had approved them in the first instance.
Gertner, supra note 71, at 2.
246. "to what extent can the Bar Association achieve its objective (stopping certain
perceived abuses) without a change in standards? And, without such a change, is the game
worth the candle?" Klubock, 832 F.2d 664 at 674 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Similarly, Chief
Judge Campbell stated that "it is difficult to imagine how PF 15 can operate meaningfully
except as a substantive modification of the existing rules." Id. at 670 (Campbell, C.J.,
dissenting).
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Consequently, if PF 15 is to have any effect on the attorney-sub
poena problem, the rule should probably be amended to incorporate
substantive standards protecting the attorney-client relationship.247
However, if PF 15 is amended along the lines originally proposed by
the Massachusetts Bar Association,248 the issue of its validity will be
raised anew. Th~ differences between existing and proposed proce
dures must be clearly understood, and it must be determined whether
those changes can be effectuated by a local court rule.

B. An Examination o/Standards Proposed to Increase Protection
the Attorney-Client Relationship

0/

The Criminal Justice divisions of the American Bar Association
(A.B.A.) and the Massachusetts Bar Association (M.B.A.) both
drafted proposals for addressing the attorney-subpoena problem. The
proposals are similar in format; both envision that the judges granting
"prior judicial approval" of attorney subpoenas will only do so if the
government has demonstrated a need for the information sought and
its relevance to a grand jury investigation in progress.
The proposal presented to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court by the M.B.A. contained standards, excluded from the promul
gated rule, by which a judge would have determined whether a partic
ular subpoena should be served. 249 In 1986, the A.B.A.'s House of
Delegates approved a resolution calling for judicial supervision of at
torney subpoenas, also including a list of standards for judicial review
when approval for such subpoenas was sought. 250 A revision of the
resolution, strengthening the recommended protections for attorneys,
247. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57, which requires notice and comment
before local court rules are promulgated or changed significantly would require an opportu
nity for the legal community to comment before changes to the Massachusetts ethical rule
was adopted by the Massachusetts federal district courts. See supra note 216 for the text of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57.
248. See infra note 249.
249. As proposed by the M.B.A., PF IS would have required a court to determine,
before approving a subpoena, that
-the information sought is not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client
privilege or the work product doctrine;
-the evidence sought is relevant to an investigation within the jurisdiction of the
grand jury;
-compliance with the subpoena would not be unreasonable or oppressive;
-the purpose of the subpoena is not primarily to harass the attorney/witness or his
or her client;
-and there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information sought.
Mass. L. Weekly, Oct. 14, 1985 at 36, col.3.
250. 54 U.S.L.W. 2415 (Feb. 18, 1986).
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was approved by the A.B.A.'s House of Delegates
1988.251 The 1988 A.B.A. standards are as follows:

1D

February,

1. the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any
applicable privilege;
2. the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an
ongoing investigation or prosecution and is not merely periph
eral, cumulative or speculative;
. 3. the subpoena lists theinformation sought' with particularity, is
directed at information regarding a limited subject matter and a
reasonably limited period of time and gives reasonable and
timely notice;
4. the purpose of the subpoena is not to harass the attorney or his
or her client; and
5. the prosecutor has unsuccessfully made all reasonable attempts
to obtain the information sought from non-attorney sources and
there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information. 252
The M.B.A. proposal specified that the proceeding at which ap
proval for a subpoena was sought should be "conducted with due re
gard for the need for the secrecy of grand jury proceedings,"
apparently leaving to the courts' discretion the choice between an ex
parte or adversarial proceeding. 253 The A.B.A., having opted in 1986
for an ex parte proceeding,254 revised its resol~tion in 1988 to call for
"an opportunity for an adversarial proceeding/,255 Both the A.B.A.
and the M.B.A. proposals contain detailed "ndxl and relevance" stan
dar:ds, requiring prosecutors to prove that theyi seek essential informa
tion which cannot be obtained from any othe~ ·source.
1.

Ex parte versus adversarial proceedings and the burden of
proof

A rule like PF 15 creates a rebuttable pre$umption that an attor
251. See 1988 A.B.A. Report, supra note 143, at 1-2 for the text of the resolution.
252. Id. at 1. .
253. "Whether the application to a trial judge [for the prior judicial approval re
quired by PF 15] will remain ex parte, or will require notice: to the attorney/witness and a
hearing is entirely a matter for judicial discretion." Affidavit of Daniel Klubock at 3-4,
United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1986),:ajJ'd, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir.),
ajJ'd en bane, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987).
254. 54 U.S.L.W. 2415 (Feb. 18, 1986).
255. 1988 A.B.A. Report, supra note 143, at 1. The A.B.A. resolution calls for the
prosecutor to submit an affidavit to the court responding to the substantive provisions of
the resolution. In general, the contents of the affidavit will be disclosed to the defense
attorney and his or her client. The resolution provides that if there is a compelling need for
secrecy, the "affidavit may be maintained as an ex parte affidavit until such time as the need
for secrecy: is no longer compelling." Id. at 2, 15.
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ney subpoena is improper. 256 Thus, the rule inevitably changes cur
rent federal practice, which places with A and B the burden of proving
that their relationship should be protected. 257 Three questions are
raised by such a presumption: 1) what substantive information must a
prosecutor provide in rebuttal; 2) to what degree will the prosecutor be
required to prove that the substantive information he or she provides
is true (burden of proof); 3) will the decision whether the subpoena
should be served be made in an ex parte or an adversarial hearing?
An ex parte proceeding258 is almost certainly the least burden
some alternative for the prosecutor seeking permission to serve A's,
subpoena. 259 As the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted, the Depart
ment of Justice Guidelines on attorney subpoenas already require a
prosecutor to compile substantial information for internal purposes
before subpoenaing an attorney.260 With some exceptions, the Guide
lines mandate protection for the attorney/witness similar to the pro
tection envisioned by the A.B.A.261
In practical terms, requiring a prosecutor to submit information
he or she had already gathered to a district court, ex parte, would not
256. Judge Murnaghan, in dissent in In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 81-1 (Harvey),
676 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir. 1982), withdrawn on other grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (1982), wrote of
the need and relevance test endorsed by the majority: "It all comes down to the choice as
to which way the presumption should run. I cannot accept a blanket presumption of irreg
ularity, and the resulting rule that proof of probable cause must precede production of any
evidence subpoenaed by the grand jury." Id. at 1013.
257. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; note 148 and accompanying text.
258. An ex parte proceeding is the current practice under PF 15. See supra note 243
and accompanying text.
259. "[T]he interference [caused by PF 15], if any, with the prosecutoriaHunction, is
highly unobtrusive. As contemplated, the judicial approval is sought in an ex parte man
ner." Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 at 657.
260. Id.
261. In fact, the substantive provisions in the 1988 A.B.A. Report are based in large
part on the D.O.J. Guidelines. See 1988 A.B.A. Report, supra note 143, at 16.
The D.O.J. Guidelines differ from the A.B.A.'s standards in explicitly permitting a
prosecutor to take into account the dangers of seeking information from a source other
than A. The Guidelines do not prohibit harassing subpoenas, but the Justice Department
would certainly not condone a subpoena issued to harass a defense attorney.
As noted in the A.B.A. Report, the D.O.J. Guidelines prohibit subpoenas to attorneys
unless the information sought is "reasonably needed for the successful completion of the
investigation or prosecution." D.O.J. GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at § 9-2.l61(a)(F)(I).
The A.B.A. Report uses slightly stronger language, requiring that the information sought
be "essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution." The
Report notes, however, that there is probably no significant practical difference between the
two standards. 1988 A.B.A. Report, supra note 143, at 16.
See Comment, An Ethical/Legal Tug of War, supra note 3, at 401 (reco.mm~nding a
federal rule based on the D.O.J. Guidelines as the solution to the attorney subpoena
problem).
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significantly burden a prosecutor,262 nor would it imperil an ongoing
grand jury investigation, as long as the submission was kept confiden
tial.263 While a rule interpreted to require ex parte proceedings places
some burden of proof on a prosecutor, the court might require nothing
more than a plausible showing on the substantive provisions of the
rule. In addition, an ex parte proceeding is more protective of the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings and guards against the possibility
that a target or an attorney, alerted to the precise nature of the infor
mation sought by the prosecutor, might conceal or destroy tangible
evidence.264
The A.B.A. proposal recognizes that A's interests would be better
served by an adversarial proceeding. Suppose the government desires
to prosecute B for tax evasion and serves a subpoena requiring A to
testify concerning amounts and dates of fee payments. The govern
ment is seeking to prove B's net worth. A might take the position that
other sources existed for information on B's assets. The prosecutor's
position, presented by affidavit to the court, might be that there was no
alternative source from which to obtain the information or that use of
an alternative source would imperil the investigation. In an ex parte
proceeding, the court would rely on the prosecutor's perception of cir
cumstances and would have no independent information to serve as a
basis for questioning that perception. In an adversarial proceeding
both sides would have a role in providing information and shaping the
court's view of the case.
Assuming an adversarial hearing, there are, broadly speaking,
two possible options with respect to allocating the burden of proof. A
prosecutor, responding to the presumption created by PF 15, would
have to provide some information with respect to all of the substantive
provisions incorporated into a revised PF 15. However, even in an
262. According to Hoffman, Kelston & Shaughnessy, "[t]he practice of the U.S. At
torney's Office in Massachusetts has been to submit the application [for an attorney sub
poena] ex parte and under seal (in camera), and to incorporate the information submitted
in compliance with the DOJ approval procedure." Hoffman, Kelston & Shaughnessy,
supra note 3, at 105 (quoting an anonymous source in the Unit¢ States Attorney's office in
BOston).
263. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena (John Doe), No. 86-665, slip op. (D. Mass. Sept.
9, 1986) (available on Lexis, Genfed Library) the court impounded the prosecutor's sub
mission and declined to reveal its contents to the party seeking to ql)ash the subpoena. [d.
at 3.
264. "If notice must be given to the attorney, what would prevent the attorney from
transferring or destroying documents or other eVidence?" Plaintiff's Memorandum in Sup
port of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 15 n.6, United States v. Klubock, 639 F.
Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir.), aff'd en bane, 832 F.2d 664 (1st
Cir. 1987).
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adversary proceeding, a court might hold the prosecutor's burden sat
isfied by a conclusory submission responding to the rule's substantive'
provisions. A might then be required to prove that the prosecutor's
submission was inaccurate.265 For example, the government might
claim there was no source other than A for information about B's pay
ment of her legal fees and that the information was relevant to a grand
jury investigation into tax evasion because the government had to es
tablish the extent of B's wealth and his expenses. Again, A's position
might be that other sources, such as bank deposit records, were avail
able to prove B's wealth and expenses. Requiring A to prove that the
records would be sufficient for the government's purpose would im
pose a burden difficult for A to meet in light of the secrecy of grand
jury proceedings. The A.B.A. proposal resolves this question by plac
ing the burden of justifying the attorney subpoena squarely with the
government. 266
Amending PF 15 to require an adversarial proceeding raises po
tential conflicts with existing federal case law. In United States v.
Dionisio,267 the Supreme Court prohibited "saddl[ing the] grand jury
with minitrials and preliminary showings [that] would ... impede its
investigation."268 In addition, an adversarial proceeding prior to ser
vice of a subpoena might reasonably be presumed to replace an attor
ney's right to a motion to quash the subpoena under Rule 17(c).269
265. This is similar to the pattern that has emerged in the Third Circuit with respect
to the Schofield rule (see supra note 145). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals announced
in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 507 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1975) (Schofield II),
that the Schofield rule was satisfied as a matter of law if the government provided "scant"
information on need and relevance. Id. at 967. The court also held that the government
did not have to "rebut each colorable contention raised by a witness." Id. at 967 n.3a. The
burden placed on the government was a matter for the discretion of the district court which
could require additional hearings and proof from ,the government as it saw fit. Id. at 966
68.
See Weiner, supra note 3, at 121, noting that "even the Third Circuit has whittled
away at the Schofield test."
266. "This procedure ... will insure that the burden of going forward with specific
facts to justify the subpoena sought will rest squarely on the party seeking the subpoena."
1988 A.B.A. Report, supra note 143, at 15.
267. 410 U.S. 1 (1972).
268. Id. at 17.
269. The A.B.A. proposal explicitly advocates replacing an attorney's Rule 17(c)
motion to quash with an earlier adversarial hearing:
[T]he current resolution contemplates, in essence, moving the post-issuance mo
tion to quash to the pre-issuance stage by requiring an in camera adversarial pro
ceeding prior to judicial approval for the subpoena being granted. . . . [I]t is
intended that the issues normally resolved at the motion to quash would be re
solved at the pre-issuance stage.
1988 A.B.A. Report, supra note 143, at 4.
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Arguably, a district court cannot effect such a change in federal proce
dure on the basis of its local rulemaking power. 270 Perhaps most im
portant, shifting a significant burden of proof to the government on
questions of attorney-client privilege or 17(c) motions to quash sub
poenas would stand in sharp contrast to current federal practice. 271
2.

a.

Proposed Substantive Standards

Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege

The A.B.A.'s first proposed standard would require the court to
determine whether the material sought by the prosecutor is protected
by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine on the
basis that such material is absolutely shielded from grand jury exami
nation. 272 Thus, in theory, if A's telephone conversations had all been
to provide B with legal advice, the judge would refuse to approve the
subpoena and it would not be served. The advantage to A and B is that
their relationship would be spared the strain of a possible appearance
by A in front of the grand jury.273
There are problems with a rigorous implementation of this stan
dard in an ex parte proceeding: the parameters of the attorney-client
privilege are not clearly defined, and A would not have an opportunity
to argue for her interpretation. A prosecutor would probably be re
quired to allege only that he or she believed that the information
sought was not privileged or that it should be accessible on the basis of
the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. 274 Only in
the case of a clear violation of the attorney-client privilege, surely a
rare occurrence, might a judge reasonably quash a subpoena on the
270. Both the district court and the members of the First Circuit Court of Appeals
who affirmed PF 15 did so in part on the basis that its provisions and the provisions in Rule
17(a) were compatible. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 122; Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 at 655. Ex
tending the courts' reasoning, a local rule which replaced a provision of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure would probably be held to contradict the federal rule. A local rule
that contradicts the provisions of a federal procedural rule is invalid. Frazier v. Heebe, 482
U.S. 641, 654 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
271. See supra note 104 and accompanying text for a description of the burden of
proof with respect to claiming the benefit of the attorney-client privilege. See supra note
148 for a description of the burden of proof with respect to subpoena defenses under Rule
17(c).
272. See supra notes 91-115 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of
an attorney's grand jury appearance; see supra note 147 and accompanying text for asser
tion of the attorney-client and work product privileges under Rule 17(c). See supra notes
66-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflict of interest created for an
attorney by receipt of a grand jury SUbpoena.
274. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
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basis of an ex parte hearing. 275
Information protected by the attorney-client privilege is currently
shielded from disclosure to the grand jury, so the first substantive pro
vision of the A.B.A. resolution proposes only a procedural change: 276
the hearing to determine whether particular material is protected
should take place before issuance of the subpoena, replacing an attor
ney's 17(c) motion to quash. 277
If a subpoena requests the production of documents, the fact that
a review takes place before the subpoena is issued should not affect the
grand jury's access to evidence. However, if the subpoena requests
testimony, a pre-issuance hearing might require a prosecutor to de
scribe-and therefore to limit-the evidence he or she plans to seek
from an attorney. In some cases, this might limit the scope of the
testimony sought from an attorney.
b.

Relevance

Second, the A.B.A. would require that "the evidence sought [be]
essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or
prosecution and . . . not merely peripheral, cumulative or specula
tive. "278 The potential gain to A and B is that A may be able to avoid
testifying altogether if it is judged that her evidence is not relevant or
essential to the investigation in progress. The federal courts define rel
275. Even in the case of In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center), 615 F.
Supp. 958 (D. Mass. 1985), where the court quashed grand jury subpoenas on the basis of
privilege without an in camera inspection because the material clearly fell within the attor
ney-client and work product privileges, the court probably needed the evidence provided by
the attorneys who brought the motion to quash. They were able to respond to the govern
ment's argument that the information should be accessible on the basis of the crime-fraud
exception to the privilege. Id. at 967-69.
276. "The first provision, requiring that the information sought not be privileged,
tracks substantive law." 1988 A.B.A. Report, supra note 143, at 16.
277. "[T]he current resolution contemplates ... moving the post-issuance motion to
quash to the pre-issuance stage by requiring an in camera adversarial proceeding prior to
judicial approval for the subpoena being granted." [d. at 4.
278. [d. at 1.
The analogous M.B.A. provision simply requires that the evidence sought be relevant
to an investigation within the jurisdiction of a grand jury. Mass. L. Weekly, Oct. 14, 1985,
at 36, col. 3. A federal grand jury's jurisdiction extends to investigating all offenses indicta
ble under a federal criminal statute. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 377
n.l (1985). Given the breadth of the grand jury's jurisdiction, the M.B.A. standard does
not limit the government's ability to subpoena information from an attorney in .any signifi
cant fashion.
See 1988 A.B.A. Report, supra note 143, at 16, noting that virtually any evidence can
be argued to be relevant in some way to a grand jury investigation, and concluding that the
relevancy standard is "too low a threshold of need."
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evancy broadly with respect to the evidence sought by a grand jury, 279
placing few limits on the scope of grand jury investigations. Thus, a
standard that requires a prosecutor to prove the essential nature of the
information sought from an attorney, placing limits on the grand
jury's subpoena power, departs from current federal practice.
The degree of protection provided to A and B by this standard
may depend more on how stringent a burden of proof is imposed on
the government than on the availability of an adversarial hearing.
Given tqe secrecy of grand jury proceedings, a judge's ability to evalu
ate the relevance of the information sought would depend on a submis
sion by the government describing the scope of the grand jury's
investigation. A defense attorney usually could not contribute to a
judge;;' ability to evaluate relevance. 280
c.

Unreasonableness

Third, the A.B.A. would require a judge to find that "the sub
poena lists the information sought with particularity, is directed at in
formation regarding a limited subject matter and a reasonably limited
period of time and gives a reasonable and timely notice."281 The
A.B.A. standard reflects the accurate notion that most grand jury in
vestigations are focused quite specifically on an incident or an individ
ual. The evidence a prosecutor seeks can often be identified with some
specificity.282 Furthermore, there is reason to believe that federal
279. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
280. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals placed the burden of proving relevance in
an attorney subpoena case on the government. The court articulated as the rationale for
shifting the burden in this context the fact that the party seeking to quash a subpoena does
"not know the scope or nature of the grand jury investigation" and cannot know it because
of the secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served
Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968, 976 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'd en bane, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), eert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
281. 1988 A.B.A. Report, supra note 143, at I.
The analogous M.B.A. standard tracks the language of Federal Rule of Criminal Pro
cedure 17(c) by requiring a judge to find that compliance with the subpoena would not be
unreasonable or oppressive. Presumably, the M.B.A. proposed to incorporate any protec
tionof the attorney-client relationship achieved in the course of litigating motions to quash
subpoenas under Rule 17(c). Attorneys facing grand jury subpoenas have derived rela
tively little protection from Rule 17(c). See supra notes 144-70 and accompanying text.
282. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings: Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Danbom),
827 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1987). The subpoena being challenged had been issued to a particu
lar Western Union office and required the production of all telegraphic money orders for
more than $1,000 for a two-year period. Id. at 302. Although the court refused to quash
the subpoenas for overbreadth, it suggested that on remand the district court might modify
the SUbpoena. Specifically, the court suggested that the government be asked to identify
characteristics that made certain wire transfers suspect, such as transfers to individuals
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prosecutors often issue overly broad subpoenas to defense attorneys. 283
This standard, too, is a departure from current federal practice, which
places few limits on the breadth of the grand jury's subpoena power. 284
Unlike the first two standards proposed by the A.B.A., a standard
requiring reasonableness in a subpoena does not relieve A of her obli
gation to testify before a grand jury in ways that may be somewhat
damaging to B. However, if the subpoena is narrowly drawn, A can
confidently explain to her client that she will have to reveal this much
and no more. The trust between attorney and client may not be
compromised.
As is the case with respect to the A.B.A.'s standard on relevance,
the degree of protection afforded to A and B may depend more on how
stringent the government's burden of proof is than on the availability
of an adversarial hearing. Because A might not know the nature of
the offense the grand jury was investigating, she probably could not
plausibly suggest means of narrowing a subpoena.
d.

Harassment

As a fourth standard, the A.B.A. proposes requiring the court to
find a subpoena was not issued primarily to harass the attorney or the
client. 285 Unlike the proposed standards concerning relevance, unrea
sonableness, and alternative sources, the requirement that a subpoena
not be issued to harass a defense attorney does not conflict with ex
isting federal practice. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the
federal courts' supervisory power to protect against any misuse of the
under suspicion or to certain areas of the country, and that the subpoena be modified to
cover only those wire transfers meeting the criteria specified by the government. Id. at 305.
283. See, e.g., Hoffman, Ke1ston & Shaughnessy, supra note 3, at 105 (describing a
case in which prosecutors subpoenaed an attorney's entire file on a client, and describing
other cases in which, after negotiations between the subpoena recipient and the prosecutor,
the subpoena was narrowed); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center), 615 F.
Supp. 958 (D. Mass. 1985) (subpoena requested entire legal files of attorneys representing
clients appearing before the Immigration and Naturalization Service).
Attorney subpoenas requesting fee information usually request information about any
and all occasions on which the attorney has handled funds or property of value for the
client who is the target of a grand jury investigation. The subpoenas are not limited as to
time or the nature of the information requested. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); In re Grand
Jury Matters, 593 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984); In re Wit
nesses Before the Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984); In re
Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1982).
284. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
285. This standard is probably unnecessary. In the event a subpoena was deliber
ately harassing, it would probably fail under the A.B.A. 's other substantive criteria.
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grand jury's powers. 286
e.

Alternative Sources

Finally, the A.B.A. proposes that a judge find there was no other
feasible source from which to obtain the information sought before
approving an attorney subpoena. 287 So, for example, ifA's subpoena
requested information about fees and property transfers as evidence of
B's wealth, a prosecutor might be required to show there was no other
way to establish the extent of B's wealth. And if the information
sought might be available from another potential witness, the prosecu
tor might be required to call the other witness before sUbpoenaing A.
If the other source was able to provide the information sought, A
might avoid testifying altogether.
Since the fact that the evidence could be obtained elsewhere has
not traditionally been a defense under 17(c) or a feature of the attor
ney-client privilege, a standard requiring the government to make an
initial showing of this nature would be a significant innovation. 288 In
an ex parte proceeding, the required showing would not impose a rig
orous burden. The prosecutor would probably simply allege the infor
mation sought could not be obtained from another source. In an
adversarial proceeding, however, A could probably suggest feasible al
ternative sources for the information in many if not most situations
and thus avoid the subpoena.
Requiring the government to first seek non-privileged information
from a source other than an attorney creates a qualified extension of
the attorney-client privilege,289 directly challenging the federal judici
ary's instrumental view of the privilege. 29o Obviously this represents a
substantial change from the federal courts' present position with re
spect to the attorney-client privilege.
The standards discussed above have been proposed by their spon
286. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
287. Similarly, a panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, adopting the "need
and relevance standard," explained that the government had not shown need because it had
not shown that "there [wa]s no other reasonably available source for that information than
the attorney." In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968, 976-77 (2d
Cir. 1985), rev'd en bane, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
288. The exception is the Third Circuit, which, since 1973, has required showings of
need when faced with proceedings to enforce any grand jury subpoena. See In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973), cerro denied, 421 U.S. 1015
(1975).
289. "[PF 15] is most akin to an expanded rule of attorney-client privilege, placing a
new and significant limitation upon a grand jury's power to seek information from certain
attorneys." Klubock, 832 F.2d 664 at 669 (Campbell, C.J., dissenting).
290. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
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sors as a means of balancing the government's need for information in
criminal prosecutions against the possible damage to attorney-client
relationships and defendants' need for effeCtive counsel. To varying
degrees, all represent departures from accepted federal practice with
respect to the scope of the grand jury's investigative powers, the scope
of the attorney-client privilege and defenses to subpoenas under Rule
17(c). They reverse the presumption with respect to the regUlarity of
grand jury proceedings. It is at least debatable that a local court rule
can validly effectuate these substantive changes.
C.

The Rulemaking Power of the Federal District Courts

The federal district courts, through their judicial councils, have
the power to make rules governing civil and criminal procedure. The
statutory basis for the power is in Rule 83 291 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Rule 57 292 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro
cedure. The courts' rulemaking power under the civil and the criminal
rules is the same in scope. 293 Local rules, if valid, have the force of
federallaw. 294
Initially, the lqwer courts' rulemaking power was expected to be
confined to matters of detail 295 and rarely used. 296 However, as com
291. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 reads in part:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to
time: after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment, make
and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. A local
pistrict rule so adopted shall take effect upon the date specified by the district
court and shall remain in effect unless amended by the district court or abrogated
by the judicial council of the circuit in which the district is located. Copies of
rules and amendments so made by any district court shall upon their promUlga
tion be furnished to the judicial council and the administrative office of the United
States Court and be made available to the public.
FED. R. CIY. P. 83.
292. See supra note 216 for the text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57.
293. The 1985 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 57 states: "Rule 57 has been refor
mulated to correspond to Fed.R.Civ.P. 83, including the proposed amendments thereto.
The purpose of the reformulation is to emphasize that the procedures for adoption of local
rules by a district court are the same under both the civil and the criminal rules." 1985
Amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57, 105 F.R.D. 179, 201 (1985).
294. United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570, 575 (1958).
295. In Klubock, Chief Judge Campbell quoted the comments of the Advisory Com
mittee to the original Rule 57 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Nevertheless it seemed best not to endeavor to prescribe a uniform practice as to
some matters of detail, but to leave the individual courts free to regulate them,
either by local rules or by usage. Among such matters are the mode of impanel
ing ajury, the manner and order of interposing challenges to jurors, the manner
of selecting a foreman of a trial jury ... and other similar details. (emphasis
added).
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mentators have noted, court practices belied that expectation;297 local
rules have proliferated, and they are not always confined to matters of
detaiJ.298 In response, in 1985, when Rules 83 and 57 were
amended,299 the aim was to enhance the process of local rulemaking
by "assur[ing] that the expert advice of practitioners and scholars"3°O
would be available to the district courts.
Although the process of enacting local rules has changed, the Ad
visory Committee Notes do not suggest any change in the purpose of
the local rulemaking power. "Local regulations are promulgated by
district courts primarily to promote efficiency of the court."301 Profes
sor Wright's treatise on federal procedure notes these examples of lo
cal court rules affecting criminal procedure: rules governing the
admission and disciplining of attorneys, rules governing the use of
stipulations and continuances, rules governing the protection of exhib
its, records and files, and rules governing the empaneling and in
structing of jurors.302 Generally speaking, these are all rules aimed at
improving the efficiency of the federal courts. 303
The limits on the courts' local rulemaking power have been de
scribed in several United States Supreme Court cases. In Miner v.
At/ass,304 the Supreme Court declared invalid a federal district court
rule that added a discovery provision to the General Admiralty Rules.
Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 at 659.
296. "The expectation of the draftsmen of Rule 83 was that the power to make local
rules would be used only on rare occasions ...." 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 218 (1973).
297. See. e.g., Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 905 (1976); Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1251 (1967); Comment, The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District
Courts - A Survey, 1966 DUKE L.J. 1011.
298. "[M]any ... sensitive mattersD have been thought the proper subject for local
rules in many districts." C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 296, at 220.
299. Prior to 1985, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 read in part:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to
time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these
rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district court shall upon
their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court of"the United States.
FED. R. CIv. P. 83 (1938).
The language of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57 was similar.
300. Amendments to Rules, 105 F.R.D. 179, 227 (1985).
301. United States v. Keane, 375 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
302. 3A C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 372-73 (1982).
303. This use of local court rules has been applauded by one commentator: "[L]ocal
rules have been essential tools in implementing court policy in administrative matters."
Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation. Legislation. or Information?,
14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 213.218 (1981).
304. 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
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The Court held that because the rule, "though concededly 'proce
dural,' may be of as great importance to litigants as many a 'substan
tive' doctrine. . . . [the procedures for national rulemaking by the
Supreme Court should be followed so] that basic procedural innova
tions [are] introduced only after mature consideration of informed
opinion from all relevant quarters."305 In Colgrove v. Battin,306 the
Court upheld a local court rule that limited the size of juries in civil
cases to six people on the same basis: controlling the size of juries was
a procedural rather than a substantive innovation 307 because doing so
would be unlikely to change the outcome of a case. 308
More recently, in Frazier v. Heebe,309 Chief Justice Rehnquist de
scribed the limitations on the lower courts' rulemaking powers: "the
rule [must not] conflictD with an Act of Congress ... the rule [must
not] conflictD with the rules of procedure promulgated by [the
Supreme] Court ... the rule [must not be] constitutionally infirm ...
the subject matter governed by the rule [must be] within the power of
a lower federal court to regulate."310 In PF 15's case, the question
raised is whether the subject matter governed by the rule is within the
power of a lower federal court to regulate.
D.

An Amended PF 15 - Valid as a Local Rule?

In Klubock, the district court, affirming the validity of PF 15 as a
local court rule, interpreted it as affecting "a narrowly defined class of
subpoenas."3!! In the district court's view, the only subpoenas af
fected would be those served in violation of the attorney-client privi
lege as interpreted by the federal courts and those served in violation
305. Id. at 650.
306. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
307. Id. at 164.
308. Steven Flanders, author of an article which argues that local court rulemaking
is an essentially positive phenomenon, criticizes the Colgrove decision:
As a matter of law interpreting rule 83, the Colgrove decision now seems impossi
ble to sustain. Surely the six-member jury is a "basic procedural innovation" at
least of equal consequence as depositions in admiralty cases, discussed in Miner v.
Atlass. ... Colgrove could only be valid ifit is read as a shift away from the Miner
standard that would permit innovation and experimentation within the local
rulemaking power on a larger scale than the Court previously thought
permissible.
Flanders, supra note 303, at 238.
309. 482 U.S. 641 (1987).
310. Id. at 654 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in
Frazier because he disagreed with the majority's position that the Supreme Court, exercis
ing a supervisory power over the lower courts, could invalidate a local court rule solely
because the Court thought it unwise or unjust.
311. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 120.
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of substantive law developed under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce
dure 17(c).312 Members of the First Circuit Court of Appeals who
affirmed PF 15's validity as a local court rule also assumed that the
rule's provisions would be harmonized with existing case law on the
scope of the attorney-client privilege and the breadth of the grand
jury's powers. 313 PF 15 was viewed as providing only "a minimal
overview by an impartial observer."314
In contrast, Chief Judge Campbell, in dissent in Klubock, as
sumed that the rule gave the district courts license to "impose substan
tive limitations of [their] own devising"315 on the power of federal
grand juries to subpoena attorneys. These two opinions can in fact be
reconciled with respect to the scope of the district courts' rulemaking
power. The disagreement is over the content of PF 15 as it was
promulgated.
A rule incorporating the standards proposed by the A.B.A. would
accomplish what Chief Judge Campbell interpreted PF 15 as doing: it
would strike a "new balance" between the government's access to in
formation and a potential defendant's right to rely on a confidential
relationship with his or her lawyer. It would do so by reversing the
presumption of regularity attaching to the grand jury's process.
To accomplish this aim, a rule amended in accordance with the
A.B.A. proposal would restrict the breadth of grand jury investiga
tions in which attorneys were potential sources of information, chal
lenging the sweeping language with which the Supreme Court has
described the power of the grand jury.316 It would expand the attor
ney-client privilege, albeit in a qualified fashion, by making an attor
ney the source of last resort for the government, contradicting the
instrumental view of the privilege adopted by the federal courtS. 317
The A.B.A. proposal "clearly involves the creation of new substantive
privilege law of ... significant consequence."318 The power given to
312.

"[PF 15] does [not] create new substantive grounds for quashing subpoenas."

Id.
313. "Even if we accept the dissent's premise that PF 15 would, in some cases, limit
a grand jury's subpoena power, this would not invalidate the rule....[I]f PF 15 does limit a
grand jury's subpoena power, it does so for a reason sanctioned by the Supreme Court and
this Circuit." Klubock,832 F.2d 649 at 658 n.22.
314. Id. at 653.
315. Id. at 661.
316. See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919): "[The witness] is not
entitled to set limits to the investigation that the grand jury may conduct. ... [The grand
jury] is a grand ... inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by
questions of propriety ...." Id. at 282.
317. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
318. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664 at 671.
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district courts to develop their own rules of procedure is not a grant of
power to reshape substantive federal law as defined by the appellate
courtS. 319 In Chief Judge Campbell's words, "a special screening pro
cedure [for attorney subpoenas] can [only] be properly established ...
by an amendment to the federal criminal rules or by legislation. "320
E.

The Rationale for Reform

For several reasons, the A.B.A. resolution on attorney subpoenas
is an appropriate starting point for discussion of a solution to the at
torney subpoena dispute. To a surprising degree, those on both sides
of the issue agree about the risk attorney subpoenas pose to the attor
ney-client relationship and about appropriate limitations on the use of
these "investigative tools." In theory, the Department of Justice
Guidelines, like the A.B.A. proposal, impose a significant burden on
the government to prove "need and relevance" with respect to an at
torney subpoena before service occurs.
The principle difference in the positions taken by the government
and the A.B.A. is over who determines whether service of an attorney
subpoena is justified. The D.O.J. Guidelines retain responsibility for
that decision squarely with Department of Justice officials.321 The
A.B.A. resolution places with federal district court judges (or magis
trates) the responsibility for deciding whether an attorney subpoena is
justified on the facts of a particular case. 322 This is a role the judiciary
has generally declined to assume when asked to do so on the basis of
its supervisory power over the grand jury 323 on the basis of Rule
179(c).324

319. Steven Flanders, discussing the appropriate use of local court rules noted that
"[c]ourts should be especially meticulous in avoiding local rules that reverse an existing
burden or presumption. Several questionable local rules, that otherwise only define a
court's usual practice, are suspect on this ground." Flanders, supra note 303, at 275 (em-,
phasis deleted).
It may also be noted that Professor Wright, in his discussion of proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence SOl, which was never enacted, concluded that the rules of privilege would quite
likely be classified as "clearly substantive." 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 682 (1980).
320. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 at 661 (Campbell, C.J., dissenting).
321. D.O.J. GUIDELINES, supra note II, at § 9-2.161(D).
322. The A.B.A. resolution calls for "an in camera adversarial proceeding prior to
judicial approval for the subpoena being granted." 1988 A.B.A. Report, supra note 143, at
4, 15.
323. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
324. One commentator noted: "The broader the judicial sway under rule 17(c), the
more courts must substitute their views for the prosecutors', and the more likely they will
be called upon to do so. Judges generally have proven unwilling to undertake such a role."
Wiener, supra note 3, at 122.
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Yet there are compelling reasons for imposing oversight by a neu
tral party on the use of attorney sUbpoenas. Attorneys cannot be com
pletely off limits as sources of information about their clients. If an
attorney is directly implicated in a client's criminal activities or if an
attorney is the only source for information that is essential to a grand
jury investigation, that information should be accessible to the govern
ment. An unqualified, expanded attorney-client privilege is not an ac
ceptable solution to the attorney-subpoena dispute.
Nor, given the adversarial character of litigation, can the Depart
ment of Justice effectively regulate use of attorney subpoenas. 32s A
prosecutor unsure of the precise nature of the information in a defense
attorney's hands must draft a subpoena broadly or risk nonproduction
of relevant evidence. Defense attorneys have proved to be sources of
relevant information in certain types of cases, such as drug cases in
volving groups of suspects 326 or tax evasion cases 327 It might be
termed irresponsible for a prosecutor to neglect a possible source of
relevant information in a criminal investigation. Finally, given the fre
quency of government motions to disqualify opposing counsel,328 it
seems inescapable that prosecutors do not make it a high priority to
preserve defense attorneys' relationships with their clients.
Judicial reluctance to define limits in the use of attorney subpoe
nas can be traced, at least in part, to United States Supreme Court
decisions which describe the grand jury's powers in very expansive
325. Members of the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirming PF IS linked use of
attorney subpoenas to the nature of the adversary process: "Last, but not necessarily least,
is the potential for abuse that underlies the natural tendencies promoted by adversarial
postures." Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 at 654.
326. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.)
(en bane) (government sought fee information from counsel to establish existence of con
spiracy), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13 (1st
Cir. 1984) (government sought fee information from counsel to establish existence of con
spiracy); Osterhoudt v. United States, 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983) (defendant being inves
tigated as major distributor of marijuana and for income tax evasion).
327. See, e.g., United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1986) (government
brought motion to disqualify opposing counsel on grounds they would be called as wit
nesses in trial prosecuting their clients for income tax evasion); Matter of Klein, 776 F.2d
628 (7th Cir. 1985) (grand jury investigating, inter alia, possible income tax evasion
charge); In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005 (grand jury investigat
ing possible income tax violations of suspected drug dealer), withdrawn on other grounds,
697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359 (9th Cir.
1982) (grand jury investigating tax protestors).
328. Of the 1,103 defense attorneys who responded to Professor William Genego's
survey of the criminal defense bar, 430, or 26% of the respondents, reported being the
target of at least one disqualification motion. Genego, supra note 3, at 4, Table I.
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terms. 329 In Klubock, Chief Judge Campbell read them to preclude
significant judicial control of attorney subpoenas in the absence of a
valid statutory basis for such control. 330 An amendment to the Fed
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure or congressionallegislation 331 could
limit the effect of these decisions.
However, the A.B.A. resolution should only be a starting point
for discussion. It purports to strike a balance between the need for a
grand jury with effective investigative powers and the need for "full
protection of the attorney-client relationship from the threat posed by
subpoenas directed to attorneys. "332 It can be criticized for treating
all attorney subpoenas as posing equally serious threats to the attor
ney-client relationship. In fact, a subpoena that "chills" the relation
ship between A and B is a much less serious intrusion than the
subpoena that results in A's disqualification (or voluntary withdrawal)
from her representation of B. If it is demonstrated (in a two-party
proceeding) that a subpoena will not seriously impair an attorney-cli
ent relationship, probably the government's burden of proof in seeking
judicial approval of that subpoena' should be lessened accordingly.
In other cases, an appropriate resolution to a dispute over an at
torney subpoena may be a compromise in which a prosecutor narrows
his or her request for information or delays an attorney subpoena until
the final stages of a grand jury investigation, when it can be really
determined whether the information is necessary or merely cumula
tive. 333 There is some evidence that compromise under judicial super
vision has solved some attorney subpoena disputes. 334

329. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Dion
isio, 410 U.S. I (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
330. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 at 661-64.
331. In 1988, Senator Paul Simon introduced as S. 2713 legislation addressing the
attorney subpoena issue. See CONGo REc. SII,438 (Aug. 10, 1988). The bill was never
acted upon, nor has new legislation been introduced in the IOlst Congress.
332. 1988 A.B.A. Report, supra note 143, at 14.
333. Hoffman, Kelston & Shaughnessy note a Massachusetts case in which an attor
ney was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury, challenged the subpoena under Rule
17(c) and lost. He then appeared in the grand jury room and claimed the attorney-client
privilege with respect to each item of evidence sought. Eventually, the judge rejected most
of these claims of privilege and ordered the attorney to testify. However, the grand jury
had proceeded sufficiently with its investigation that it no longer needed the attorney's
evidence. Hoffman, Kelston & Shaughnessy, supra note 3, at 105.
334. See Hoffman, Kelston & Shaughnessy, supra note 3, at 105 (describing several
cases after PF IS's enactment in which attorneys and federal prosecutors have reached a
compromise concerning the information to be provided).
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CONCLUSION

The government's increasing reliance on attorney subpoenas as
"investigative tools" raises concerns in a legal system where compli
ance with the law depends on access to informed, effective legal advice.
As long ago as 1947, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
privacy is essential to the attorney's role in society:
In performing his various duties ... it is essential that a lawyer
work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intru
sion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a
client's case demands that he assemble information, shift what he
considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his
legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless in
terference. That is the historical and the necessary way in which
lawyers act within ... our system of jurisprudence to promote jus
tice and to protect their clients' interests. 335

Attorney subpoenas pose a range of threats to the attorney-client
relationship ranging from strain and disruption to complete destruc
tion. Given the importance of the attorney's role in our legal system,
the ability to subpoena an attorney should not rest unchecked with
opposing counsel. A subpoena to an attorney demanding evidence
damaging to his or her client should be the unusual exception to a
general rule discouraging this form of discovery. Although the nature
of the concerns raised by attorneY subpoenas has been recognized by a
number of federal courts,336 current federal practices and procedures
do not sufficiently protect the attorney-client relationship.
PF 15 was an attempt to address this perceived deficiency. The
attempt, although perhaps of symbolic value,337 is not a viable solu
tion. The rule can only be truly effective if it is amended to require
that the gov.ernment assume the burden of demonstrating its need for
and the relevance of the information it seeks from the subpoenaed at
torney. Such a substantive change in the law of privilege is beyond the
power of district court rulemaking. Action at the national level-Ieg
islation or an amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce
dure-is needed to ensure that attorney-client relationships are not
sacrificed unnecessarily in the name of effective law enforcement.

Katherine A. Robertson
335. Hickman Y. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1946).
336. See supra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
337. "PF 15 will make a difference .... It unquestionably has a symbolic impor
tance." Gertner, supra note 71, at 44.

